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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Since 2007, new threats to the physical security of ordinary citi-
zens have materialized in Mexico and Colombia. A long history of 
drug trafficking in Mexico has entered into a new phase, as cartels 
violently contest territorial control with each other and with the gov-
ernment. Meanwhile, Colombian paramilitary groups, which were 
supposedly eliminated through the 2003–2006 demobilization pro-
 * Professor, Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano. The research for this Arti-
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Colombia), Fulbright Grantee, and Harvard University Frederick Sheldon Traveling Fel-
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cess, have reemerged in an altered form, without clear anti-insurgent 
goals and a greater focus on gains from illegal businesses.1 By 2012, 
they had become the leading cause of human rights and humanitari-
an law abuses in Colombia, responsible for between thirty and fifty 
percent of all abuses.2 While these phenomena are dissimilar in some 
ways, the two countries share a serious problem of militarized crimi-
nal organizations that are devoted to the production and transporta-
tion of drugs and willing to unleash violence against the civilian pop-
ulation to do so. In fact, some commentators have argued that vio-
lence in Colombia and Mexico has converged, in the sense that in 
both countries the violence is now primarily driven by the logic of 
illegal business that requires territorial control.3 
 In Colombia, the sixty-year-old armed conflict has changed char-
acter since 2006. Out of the flawed demobilization of right-wing par-
amilitary groups between 2003 and 2006, new violent groups have 
emerged: the so-called Bacrim (from the Spanish for “criminal 
bands”) or neoparamilitaries. While the choice of terminology to de-
scribe these groups has become politicized based on the connection it 
implies with the old paramilitaries,4 I will use the term “neoparamili-
taries,” as it reflects the origins of the new groups while admitting 
the possibility that they are not identical in all respects to earlier 
paramilitaries. These neoparamilitaries have continued to commit 
the sort of widespread acts of violence, including targeted assassina-
 1. See Alonso Tobón García, Dinámicas y usos de la violencia neoparamilitar en el 
Valle del Cauca 12 (CENTRO DE RECURSOS PARA EL ANÁLISIS DE CONFLICTOS [CERAC], 
Working Paper No. 18, 2012) (Colom.), available at http://www.cerac.org.co/assets/pdf/ 
CERAC_WP18.pdf. 
 2. See CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIÓN Y EDUCACIÓN POPULAR [CINEP] & PROGRAMA POR 
LA PAZ [PPP], INFORME ESPECIAL: SOBRE LA SITUACIÓN DE DERECHOS HUMANOS Y DERECHO 
INTERNACIONAL HUMANITARIO EN COLOMBIA DURANTE 2012 3, 10-11 (2013) (Colom.), avai-
lable at http://www.cinep.org.co/images/stories/Documentos/Informe_Especial_mayo2013_ 
final.pdf (the CINEP database registered 565 human rights abuses neoparamilitaries, 268 
by the national police and 187 by the national army, as well as 493 humanitarian law 
violations by the neoparamilitaries, 347 by FARC, 118 by the national army, 98 by comba-
tants, 72 by the national police, and 48 by ELN); Marguerite Cawley, BACRIM Responsible 
for 30% of Human Rights Violations in Colombia, INSIGHTCRIME (Apr. 16, 2013) (Colom.), 
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/bacrim-perpetrators-of-30-crimes-reported-in-
colombia-govt. 
 3. Mauricio García Villegas & José Rafael Espinosa Restrepo, Crimen, conflicto 
armado y Estado en Colombia, México y Guatemala 3 (DeJuSticia, Working Paper No. 7, 
2012); cf. Richard Snyder & Angélica Durán Martínez, Drugs, Violence, and State-
Sponsored Protection Rackets in Mexico and Colombia, 70 COLOM. INTERNACIONAL 61 
(2009) (analyzing the levels of violence in Mexico and Colombia in terms of state regulation 
of illegal markets, but not focusing specifically on neoparamilitaries). 
 4. The government de-emphasizes the paramilitary origins of the groups by calling 
them “criminal bands” (bandas criminales, or Bacrim), while some NGOs, including Corpo-
ración Nuevo Arco Iris and the Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, emphasize this connec-
tion with the name “neoparamilitaries.” 
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tions and massacres,5 which were common prior to the paramilitary 
demobilization. They are massive organizations that extend over en-
tire regions—both rural and urban zones—and violently contest con-
trol over illegal industries, such as the production and trafficking of 
drugs. They pose a serious threat to the physical security of many 
Colombians that extends well beyond the danger posed by many oth-
er sorts of criminal organizations. Different from other forms of orga-
nized crime, the groups are militarized, having adopted military-
grade weapons, military-type organization, and military methods to 
protect and expand their economic activities. The International 
Committee for the Red Cross (“ICRC”), for instance, has found that 
some of these groups have sufficient organization and capacity for 
violence to make them parties to the internal armed conflict.6 
 One role that has been assumed by international human rights 
courts—namely the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights—is that of reviewing state efforts 
to protect against threats to human rights that come from such non-
state sources. Both of these courts have found states responsible for 
their failure to take reasonable protective measures against threats 
posed by groups that in some important respects resemble the neo-
paramilitaries in Colombia. Examples include finding Turkey re-
sponsible for assassinations carried out by shadowy state-aligned 
militant groups7 and finding Colombia responsible for a massacre by 
paramilitary forces.8 According to the common rule that the courts 
have adopted, the threshold requirement for any such review is that 
the state knew or should have known of a specific risk either to the 
victim or to a limited group to which the victim belonged. Such a 
threshold requirement determines the circumstances in which a 
court may review the actions that a state has undertaken to prevent 
serious human rights violations. The current threshold requirement 
is narrow: it technically excludes from review all claims of inade-
quate state protection in which it cannot be claimed that the state 
knew or should have known of a specific risks to the victim (or the 
victim’s group). 
 5. In this Article, I will use the term “massacre” to refer to a single event in which 
the perpetrating person or group kills three or more people. 
 6. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Documento sobre la participación de ciertos grupos 
armados emergentes en el conflicto armado no internacional en Colombia 3 (2011) (un-
published report), available at http://otramiradadelconflicto.wikispaces.com/file/view/ 
Calificaci%C3%B3n+GAE+de+CICR.pdf. 
 7. Akkoç v. Turkey, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 389, ¶¶ 85-92; Kılıç v. Turkey, 2000-III 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 75, ¶¶ 69-71, 75; Koku v. Turkey, App. No. 27305/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶¶ 137-
41 (2005); Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 149, ¶¶ 91-99. 
 8. Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶¶ 124, 126 (Jan. 31, 2006). 
                                                                                                                  
344  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:341 
 
 This Article will argue that such a threshold requirement is overly 
narrow given the violence from these militarized criminal organiza-
tions, in that it unnecessarily and inappropriately excludes many of 
their actions from court review in light of general principles that the 
courts already accept. Careful consideration of these principles indi-
cates (as this Article will argue) that the human rights courts should 
adopt a rule that extends review to situations in which state officials 
knew (or should have known) that a militarized criminal organiza-
tion posed a threat to the local population. The state should then be 
held responsible if: (i) its officials failed to take reasonable measures 
to reduce or eliminate this threat, (ii) the organization committed 
acts of violence against a person, and (iii) the measures not taken 
would have had a reasonable chance of preventing the acts of vio-
lence. Such an expanded threshold requirement would allow review 
of the failure, for example, of local public security forces to confront a 
locally active group and to detain its members or prevent them from 
acting, even when those forces lack knowledge of specific acts of vio-
lence that the group was likely to commit.9 
 The expansion of the review threshold requirement is appropriate 
because the groups constitute what I will call Militarized Criminal 
Organizations, a status that renders them particularly severe threats 
to the physical security of individuals.10 Broadly speaking, a Milita-
rized Criminal Organization (“MCO”) is an organization whose pur-
pose is “to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit”11 and whose nature nearly or actually renders it capable of 
 9. Expanded court oversight of state protection efforts via broadened responsibility 
rules is one way to address the problem of human rights violations committed by non-state 
actors. For other human rights approaches to the problem, see generally Office of the High 
Comm’r for Human Rights, International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed 
Conflict, at 72, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/01 (2011); INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, 
ENDS & MEANS: HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ARMED GROUPS 33-37 (2000); Pablo 
Policzer, Human Rights Violations Beyond the State, 5 J. HUM. RTS. 215, 216-18 (2006); 
August Reinisch, The Changing International Legal Framework, in NON-STATE ACTORS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 37, 38-41 (Philip Alston ed., 2005). Ian Brownlie offered an instructive 
but somewhat outdated legal analysis of “armed bands” in Ian Brownlie, International Law 
and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 712 (1958). 
 10. The definition of a Militarized Criminal Organization offered here is somewhat 
tangential to the ongoing debate over the nature of paramilitary and neoparamilitary 
groups in Colombia, as it is primarily intended as a legal category and not a deep under-
standing of the groups. For examples of the debate over the groups, see GUSTAVO DUNCAN, 
LOS SEÑORES DE LA GUERRA: DE PARAMILITARES, MAFIOSOS Y AUTODEFENSAS EN COLOM-
BIA (2006); Jasmin Hristov, Self-Defense Forces, Warlords, or Criminal Gangs? Towards a 
New Conceptualization of Paramilitarism in Colombia, 43 LAB., CAPITAL & SOC’Y 13 (2010).  
 11. U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex 
I, art. 2(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000) (“ ‘Organized criminal group’ shall mean 
a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in 
concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in 
accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit.”). 
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being party to an internal armed conflict under International Hu-
manitarian Law.12 In this sense, it has three features beyond its pur-
pose. First, it has a sufficient degree of internal organization, includ-
ing a responsible command structure, to plan armed operations.13 
Second, it has the capacity for and exercises military-style force that 
rises above mere “isolated and sporadic acts of violence.”14 Third, it 
exercises at least quasi-territorial control. In contrast to the territo-
rial control necessary to render an organized armed group a party to 
the conflict under Additional Protocol II,15 an MCO may have quasi-
territorial control without excluding the state from a territory so long 
as it excludes some other MCO, armed group, or quasi-armed group. 
Because they meet these criteria, MCOs pose a serious threat to citi-
zen security in the areas where they operate. By also constituting a 
criminal organization, they are likely to provoke less government 
reaction than a rebel group, in part because they tend to corrupt 
state officials at least in the local levels of government.  
 In the face of such organizations, the current threshold require-
ment for review of state protection efforts does not allow review of 
and responsibility for many acts of preventable MCO violence. Under 
current rules, a state is responsible for inadequate protection only 
when state officials knew (or should have known) that the victim of 
the violence was at risk and failed to take reasonable action to pre-
vent the risk from materializing. Violence by MCOs often fails to 
satisfy the knowledge of risk requirement. The organizations often 
commit acts of violence that are not conducted on behalf of state forc-
es, with their assistance, or under circumstances in which state offi-
cials know the violence will occur. Instead, by and large, state offi-
cials know only that MCOs are present in an area and have the pro-
pensity and capacity to commit severe acts of violence. They do not 
know who will be a victim or when particular acts of violence will be 
committed. As a result, the current threshold requirement does not 
allow the review of a large number of the preventable acts of violence 
that MCOs commit. The requirement demands some form of 
knowledge of the specific act that the non-state actor commits, an 
element that is often absent with MCO violence. 
 12. A group could meet this requirement absent an armed conflict if it would or nearly 
would be capable of constituting a party should an armed conflict exist.  
 13. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, Additional Protocol II art. 1(1), Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 611. 
 14. Id. at art. 1(2). 
 15. Id. at art. 1(1). According to the International Committee for the Red Cross, Addi-
tional Protocol II requires hostilities between the non-state armed group and state forces, 
while the Geneva Convention IV, Common Article 3 requires only hostilities between two 
or more non-state armed groups. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Opinion Paper, How is the 
Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law? (Mar. 2008), available 
at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf. 
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 The proposed modification of the traditional threshold require-
ment is based on the application of principles governing review of 
inadequate protection cases in the context of the violence surround-
ing MCOs, using the situation with neoparamilitaries in Colombia as 
a case study. Current jurisprudence generally recognizes a broad 
state obligation to protect those in its territory against violence from 
non-state actors,16 but the conditions in which the courts will review 
a state’s allegedly inadequate protection efforts are narrower. How-
ever, the courts have been willing to allow additional review of state 
protection efforts in light of systemic risks that states will fail to pro-
tect adequately, permitting the courts to apply their limited institu-
tional competence when it is most likely to be needed. At the same 
time, courts have been particularly attentive to the need to respect 
their institutional position by avoiding unnecessary interference with 
state policy-making by overly scrutinizing the balance of priorities 
that states adopt. 
 The main principle, implicit in the jurisprudence, calls on courts 
to allow review of cases when there is a systemic risk that the state 
will fail to protect its citizens adequately from violence, such as that 
arising from MCOs. Such a principle allows the courts to control the 
number of cases on already overcrowded dockets and avoid inappro-
priately interfering with state policy-making while also flexibly ex-
panding review in order to fulfill the court purpose of safeguarding 
human rights. By expanding the scope of review in response to seri-
ous and systemic risks of inadequate protection, the courts can econ-
omize judicial resources while also using them in those cases where 
they are most needed. Expanding review can motivate states to com-
ply with their human rights obligation to protect by holding them 
accountable for failures to fulfill the obligation and by changing the 
way policy makers, judges, activists, and the public view the prob-
lem.17 State protection efforts against MCOs particularly merit such 
loosened review requirements. Several characteristics of MCOs cre-
ate a substantial systemic risk that the state will fail to act suffi-
ciently: MCOs do not directly oppose the state, they systematically 
corrupt state officials, and they primarily affect groups of less con-
cern to the central government.   
 At the same time, the human rights courts have been reluctant to 
excessively interfere with state policy-making. In fact, the courts 
have explicitly adopted a principle that requires them to limit the 
 16. Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 124 (Jan. 31, 2006) (citing Kılıç v. Turkey, 2000-III 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 75, ¶¶ 62-63; Osman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23452/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 
¶¶ 115-16 (1998)). 
 17. See César Rodríguez-Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial 
Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1669 (2011). 
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review of state protective measures in order to avoid such excessive 
interference. Such unreasonable interference would occur if the state 
could be held responsible for every act of violence within its territory 
or under its jurisdiction, even if the violence could only be prevented 
by adopting new, general criminal justice policies. However, when 
faced with MCOs, such as the neoparamilitaries in Colombia, there is 
less of a concern that expanding state responsibility will unreasona-
bly interfere with the state, because the MCOs themselves provide a 
clear target for specific protective actions.   
 It is important to be clear about how adopting the proposed rule 
would affect ordinary human rights protections against state actions. 
First, the fact that more inadequate protection cases would be subject 
to court scrutiny—effectively requiring that the state take additional 
protective measures—would not excuse any state human rights viola-
tions committed while protecting its citizens. These are unacceptable 
under all circumstances, including when a state is fulfilling its obli-
gation to ensure citizen security in the face of MCOs.18 In this sense, 
review under a broader range of circumstances is no different from 
that under more restrictive circumstances: neither would excuse any 
state human rights violations. Second, the call for a loosened thresh-
old requirement applies only to those circumstances in which the 
state is unlikely to be overzealous in its protective obligations, as 
these circumstances in part motivate the appropriateness of the re-
laxed requirement. For example, in the context of Colombian neopar-
amilitaries, there are a number of reasons to expect the state to react 
inadequately to the threat these groups pose. The groups may have 
connections through shared interests to elements of the state security 
forces or to economic elites, as did the paramilitary groups from 
which they emerged. They have corrupted many members of the 
state security forces, especially those operating at the local level. Fi-
nally, as the violence primarily affects disfavored segments of society, 
the state may fail to react out of apathy. For all of these reasons, the 
most likely problem is not state overzealousness but a lack of motiva-
tion to ensure citizen security. 
 This Article is divided into seven parts, including this introduc-
tion. The second part will provide an overview of the situation in Co-
lombia, characterizing the main neoparamilitary groups, their struc-
ture and methods, and the human rights violations that they commit. 
It will also describe the Colombian state response to the emergence of 
these neoparamilitary groups. The third part will describe the cur-
rent responsibility rule for state failure to protect, as developed by 
 18. Of course, under many international human rights treaties, some human rights 
are derogable in appropriate emergency circumstances. However, the rights to life and 
physical integrity, which are the rights generally at issue with MCO violence, are non-
derogable. 
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the Inter-American and European human rights courts, and it will 
discuss its limited application to neoparamilitaries in Colombia. The 
fourth part will identify and diagnose how the courts have flexibly 
applied the announced threshold requirement to expand the scope of 
court review—particularly in situations of near-armed conflict. The 
fifth part argues that a significant consideration relevant for deci-
sions to broaden review—the systemic risk of state failure to fulfill its 
broad obligation of protection—is highly relevant to MCOs, such as 
those in contemporary Colombia. The sixth part argues that the pri-
mary consideration that has led the courts to limit the scope of re-
sponsibility—specifically, the avoidance of unreasonable interference 
with state policy-making—has limited application in the circum-
stances presented by MCOs. Finally, the seventh part concludes the 
Article by briefly recapping the argument and explaining the princi-
pal effects of the proposed modified rule. 
II.   NEOPARAMILITARY GROUPS IN COLOMBIA 
 This part will present the current situation of neoparamilitary 
activity in Colombia. It will begin by describing how the neoparamili-
tary groups emerged from the paramilitary demobilization, the cur-
rent panorama of active groups, and their general structures. Follow-
ing this background, it will characterize the businesses of the groups 
as well as the human rights violations that they commit. Having ex-
plained the nature of the challenge that the groups pose, it will turn 
to the general state response to the neoparamilitaries and to the par-
ticular problem of corruption. 
A.   Emergence of the Neoparamilitaries 
 This so-called third generation of paramilitarism 19  is largely a 
continuation of the last, as the neoparamilitaries emerged from the 
flawed demobilization of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
(“AUC”).20 The AUC was a national organization or network of para-
military forces devoted to combating guerrilla groups and protecting 
various economic interests, both legal and illegal.21 In 1997 various 
regional paramilitary groups formed a tenuous alliance under the 
banner of the AUC at the instigation of one regional organization.22 
 19. Conflict Dynamics and Peace Negotiations Area, Siguiendo el conflicto: hechos y 
análisis: Where is Paramilitarism Heading in Colombia, FUNDACIÓN IDEAS PARA LA PAZ 1 
(Jan. 2010), http://www.ideaspaz.org/images/Siguiendo_58_19-01-10_en.pdf. 
 20. CENTRO NACIONAL DE MEMORIA HISTÓRICA, ¡BASTA YA! COLOMBIA: MEMORIAS DE 
GUERRA Y DIGNIDAD 186-89 (2013). 
 21. See MAURICIO ROMERO, PARAMILITARES Y AUTODEFENSAS 1982–2003, at 18-23 
(2003). 
 22. The Castaño brothers, then leaders of the ACCU, were the primary force behind 
the formation of the AUC. 
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Between 1997 and 2003, the peak of the AUC’s activity, it was re-
sponsible for massive attacks on the civil population, including large-
scale massacres and mass displacements. For example, an attack by 
450 paramilitaries of the Northern Block of the AUC on the town of 
El Salado in February 2000 left 60 people dead and 4000 displaced.23 
Between 2002 and 2005, the Uribe administration passed several 
laws, most notably the Justice and Peace Law,24 to demobilize the 
paramilitary organizations by granting their members special crimi-
nal law benefits.25   
 However, many mid-level—and some top-level—paramilitary 
commanders chose not to go through the Justice and Peace process or 
went through it disingenuously.26 The effect of the transfer of power 
to mid-level commanders was a splintering of whatever unity had 
existed in the AUC. Immediately following the demobilization, a sub-
stantial number of neoparamilitary groups emerged, with approxi-
mately half of the commanders being former paramilitaries but with 
many lower ranking members being new recruits.27 According to one 
NGO, approximately 43 groups were active in 2006,28 while another 
reported 101 in 2007,29 with 3000 people allegedly belong to these 
groups following the end of the paramilitary demobilization process 
in 2007.30 More recently, the National Police claimed that in 2010 
here were 3749 members,31 while Indepaz asserted that there were 
 23. GONZALO SÁNCHEZ G. ET AL., GRUPO DE MEMORIA HISTÓRICA, LA MASACRE DE       
EL SALADO: ESA GUERRA NO ERA NUESTRA 24-28, 48 (2009), available at 
http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2009/informe_la_masacre_
de_el_salado.pdf. 
 24. L. 782, diciembre 23, 2002, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.); L. 975, julio 25, 2005, 
DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).  
 25. OFICINA DEL ALTO ASESOR PARA LA SEGURIDAD NACIONAL, POLITICA INTEGRAL DE 
LUCHA CONTRA LAS BANDAS CRIMINALES (BACRIM) 1 (2011) (Colom.) (reporting the demobi-
lization of 31,671 paramilitaries). 
 26. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PARAMILITARIES’ HEIRS: THE NEW FACE OF VIOLENCE 
IN COLOMBIA 5-6, 19-20, 28 (2010) (Colom.); OFICINA DEL ALTO ASESOR PARA LA SEGURIDAD 
NACIONAL, supra note 25, at 2 (reporting that the groups have armed wings to protect 
themselves from other groups and the state); Int’l Crisis Grp., Colombia’s New Armed 
Groups, LATIN AM. REP. NO. 20, May 2007, at 6, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/ 
media/files/latin-america/colombia/20_colombia_s_new_armed_groups.ashx. 
 27. Interview with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, Asesora, Oficina del Alto Asesor para 
la Seguridad Nacional, in Bogotá, Colom. (Jan. 11, 2012). 
 28. CAMILO GONZÁLEZ POSSO, INDEPAZ, V INFORME SOBRE NARCOPARAMILITARES EN 
2010, at 3 (2011) (Colom.), available at http://www.indepaz.org.co/wp-content/uploads/ 
2011/03/586_V-Informe-2010-INDEPAZ-15-03-2011.pdf.   
 29. Interview with Ariel Fernando Ávila Martinez, Coordinador, Observatorio del 
Conflicto Armado, Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, in Bogotá, Colom. (Jan. 16, 2012). 
 30. Permanent Council, Eighth Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Per-
manent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia, at 6, CP/doc. 
4176/07 (Feb. 14, 2007). 
 31. GONZÁLEZ POSSO, supra note 28, at 3. But see Int’l Crisis Grp., Policy Briefing: 
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approximately 7100 members that year (between 8200 and 14,500 if 
support networks were included).32  
 By 2013, these groups had consolidated, by agreement and by for-
cible takeover,33 into four or five principal groups, with the Urabeñ-
os34 and the Rastrojos35 clearly the most important.36 By 2009, the 
combined military capacity of these groups exceeded that of Colom-
Improving Security Policy in Colombia, LATIN AM. REP. NO. 23, June 2010, at 9, available 
at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/B23%20Improving% 
20Security%20Policy%20in%20Colombia.pdf (asserting that the National Police reported 
2580 members in 159 municipalities and 18 departments, presumably in late 2009 or early 
2010); Mauricio Romero Vidal & Angélica Arias Ortiz, A diez años del inicio del Plan Co-
lombia: Los herederos de las AUC, la geografía del narcotráfico y la amenaza de nuevos 
carteles, 16 ARCANOS 4, 13 (2011) (Colom.) (asserting that the National Police reported 
neoparamilitary presence in 152 municipalities across 20 departments for 2010) (citing 
Intervención de General Naranjo, Director de la Policia Nacional, Conversatorio, Desafíos 
criminales y acción del Estado (Jan. 25, 2011)). 
 32. GONZÁLEZ POSSO, supra note 28, at 3. However, DAS claimed there were only 2162 
members. Vidal & Ortiz, supra note 31 (citing Yamid Amat entrevista a Director del DAS, 
EL TIEMPO (July 3, 2010) (Colom.), http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-
7787693).  
 33. OFICINA DEL ALTO ASESOR PARA LA SEGURIDAD NACIONAL, supra note 25, at 2; 
Interview with Carlos Andrés Prieto, Coordinador, Área de Dinámicas del Conflicto y 
Negociaciones de Paz, Fundación Ideas para la Paz, in Bogotá, Colom. (Jan. 11, 2012). 
 34. This group formed directly from the forces of the demobilized Elmer Cardenas 
Bloc of the AUC in the Urabá, Antioquia region of Colombia. Daniel Rendón (“Don Mar-
io”)—who did not demobilize and is the brother of former Elmer Cárdenas Bloc Command-
er Freddy Rendón—founded the group. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 33, 69. In 
2012, they had some presence in as many as 23 different departments and 218 municipali-
ties, primarily in northern Colombia. INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS PARA EL DESSARROLLO Y LA 
PAZ (INDEPAZ), VIII INFORME SOBRE GRUPOS NARCOPARAMILITARIES 4 (2013) (Colom.) [here-
inafter INDEPAZ, VIII INFORME], available at http://www.indepaz.org.co/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/08/Informe-VIII-Indepaz-final.pdf.   
 35. The Rastrajos emerged from the military division of the North of the Valley drug 
cartel, but it includes a large number of former AUC fighters. Originally led by Wilber 
Varela of the North of the Valley cartel, the Rastrojos was not permitted to participate in 
the AUC demobilization because the government considered it to be a criminal organiza-
tion. Instead, it used the demobilization as a chance to expand, such as when it moved into 
Nariño in 2005 after the local paramilitary bloc demobilized. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra 
note 26, at 33-34; Int’l Crisis Grp., supra note 26, at 7, 12-13; Vidal & Ortiz, supra note 31, 
at 23. In 2012, they had some presence in as many as 24 departments and 236 municipali-
ties. INDEPAZ, VIII INFORME, supra note 34, at 4.   
 36. INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS PARA EL DESSARROLLO Y LA PAZ (INDEPAZ), VII INFORME 
SOBRE PRESENCIA DE GRUPOS NARCOPARAMILITARES EN EL 2011, at 1, 4 (2012) (Colom.) 
[hereinafter INDEPAZ, VII INFORME], available at http://www.indepaz.org.co/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/03/722_VII-Informe-presencia-narcoparamilitarismo-2011-INDEPAZ.pdf; 
Sofía León Oñate, Se Acabó la Primera Generación de los Neoparamilitaries, ¿Qué Sigue?, 
18 ARCANOS 2, 2-3 (2013) (Colom.); En Colombia quedan cinco bandas criminales: general 
León Riaño, EL PAÍS (Sept. 25, 2012) (Colom.), http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/judicial/ 
noticias/general-riano-afirma-capturado-jefe-paisas-sera-reemplazado (reporting a state-
ment by the National Police Director); Pacho Escobar, El Estado no ha podido con            
las Bacrim y ganan “Los Urabeños,” ARCO IRIS (Mar. 7, 2013) (Colom.), 
http://www.arcoiris.com.co/2013/03/el-estado-no-ha-podido-con-las-bacrim-y-ganan-los-
urabenos; Interview with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, Asesora, Oficina del Alto Asesor para 
la Seguridad Nacional, in Bogotá, Colom. (Dec. 23, 2011).  
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bia’s FARC rebels, executing double the total number of militant ac-
tions.37 During the period from 2006 to 2008, 55 percent of reported 
neoparamilitary group activities were offensive actions, 26 percent 
were threats, and only 12 percent were combat with public forces.38 
Indepaz indicated that the groups were present in 409 municipalities 
in 31 departments during 2012,39 while Nuevo Arco Iris found neo-
paramilitaries to be present in 337 municipalities. 40  The national 
police, in turn, claimed the groups were active in only 118 municipali-
ties in 2012, down from 159 in 2010, while also asserting that the num-
ber of members had increased to 4170 members from 3749 members.41 
 While local units of the groups are more structured and hierar-
chical than the national-level groups, the neoparamilitary groups 
generally share a moderate degree of organization.42 In rural regions, 
they are hierarchically structured to permit “direct combat and coor-
dinated military actions,” while in urban regions they use local gangs 
to exercise violence on their behalf. 43  Beyond local organizational 
patterns, neoparamilitary groups have substantial regional and na-
tional organization, with the Urabeños currently more centralized 
than the Rastrojos.44 As the early 2012 armed or enforced strike (paro 
armado) indicates, the Urabeños have the capacity to take substan-
tial coordinated actions at least at the regional level, but possibly 
more broadly.45 They effectively forced all the businesses in the af-
fected areas, including the major coastal city of Santa Marta, to shut 
 37. Mauricio Romero & Angélica Arias, Sobre paramilitares, neoparamilitares y 
afines: Crecen sus acciones, ¿qué dice el gobierno?, 15 ARCANOS 34, 34-36 (2010) (Colom.). 
 38. Id. at 38. 
 39. INDEPAZ, VIII INFORME, supra note 34, at 2. According to Indepaz, the Defensora 
del Pueblo (Public Defender) reported successor group presence in 188 municipalities and 
23 departments for 2010, while DAS reported their presence in only 54 municipalities and 
claimed there were only 2162 members. GONZÁLEZ POSSO, supra note 28, at 3; Vidal & 
Ortiz, supra note 31, at 4, 13. The Observatorio del Conflicto Armado de la Corporación 
Nuevo Arco Iris reported that in 2010 neoparamilitaries were present in 226 municipalities 
across 28 departments. Id. 
 40. Oñate, supra note 36, at 13; Pacho Escobar, Los carteles neoparamilitares que 
mandan en Colombia, ARCO IRIS (July 3, 2013) (Colom.), http://www.arcoiris.com.co/ 
2013/03/los-carteles-neoparamilitares-que-mandan-en-colombia/. 
 41. INDEPAZ, VIII INFORME, supra note 34, at 3.   
 42. Interview with Ariel Fernando Ávila Martinez, supra note 29. According to Ávila, 
the neoparamilitaries have considered branding important in order to facilitate negotia-
tions with the government and to open the possibility of a future demobilization. Despite 
the need to establish a brand, the groups generally do not wear uniforms or any sort of 
distinctive emblem, although they occasionally wear uniforms in highly contested regions, 
such as in Cordobá and Antioquia. Some neoparamilitary groups have even published and 
distributed operational manuals of sorts, including guidelines on compliance with Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law. Id.; Interview with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, supra note 36. 
 43. See, e.g., Oñate, supra note 36, at 5; García, supra note 1, at 11, 16. 
 44. Interview with Ariel Fernando Ávila Martinez, supra note 29.  
 45. Los ‘Urabeños’ muestran su poder regional, SEMANA (Jan. 6, 2012) (Colom.), 
http://www.semana.com/nacion/urabenos-muestran-su-poder-regional/169971-3.aspx.  
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down without firing a single shot.46 The ICRC determined that the 
organization of the Urabeños and the Rastrojos was sufficient to ren-
der them parties to Colombia’s internal armed conflict.47 At the end 
of 2012, the Defensor del Pueblo, a principal public official responsi-
ble for protecting human rights in Colombia, publicly declared that 
the neoparamilitary groups have sufficient command authority and 
structure to constitute illegal armed groups under humanitarian law.48 
B.   Business and Violence 
 Either in pursuit of their illegal businesses, or to promote other 
interests, the groups have committed wide-ranging acts of violence 
against the civilian populace of Colombia, in both rural and urban 
regions.49 The primary economic focus of neoparamilitaries is on con-
trolling the drug trade—primarily the manufacturing and distribu-
tion of cocaine, but also control of coca farming—and the illegal min-
ing sector, with territorial presence and control emphasizing the are-
as important for these activities.50 In their territories, they engage in 
widespread extortion, in what government officials have referred to 
as “administering the territory,”51 a form of unofficial taxation of the 
local population. 52  Importantly, they have also violently protected 
 46. Id.   
 47. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 6, at 3. Other organizations had indicated 
that the ERPAC also had sufficient structure to be a party to the armed conflict. HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 9; Int’l Crisis Grp., Dismantling Colombia’s New Illegal 
Armed Groups: Lessons from a Surrender, LATIN AM. REP. NO. 41, June 2012, at 2 (strongly 
implying that ERPAC and other groups should be considered parties to the armed conflict). 
Even ex-president Uribe has supported the determination that the neoparamilitary groups 
are parties to the conflict. See Int’l Crisis Grp., supra, at 2. 
 48.  ‘Bandas criminales deben ser catalogadas como grupos armados ilegales,’ EL 
TIEMPO (Nov. 13, 2012) (Colom.), http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/ARTICULO-WEB-
NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-12376523.html; Diana C. Durán, Bacrim, más que delincuentes, 
EL ESPECTADOR (Nov. 14, 2012) (Colom.), http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/ 
articulo-387073-bacrim-mas-delincuentes. 
 49. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 6; Codhes, Incremento en vulneraciones a 
los derechos humanos: El desplazamiento Masivo y la Situación Indígena, BOLETÍN DE LA 
CONSULTORÍA PARA LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y EL DESPLAZAMIENTO, no. 80, Dec. 2012, at 
6-7 (Ecuador). 
 50. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 28; Int’l Crisis Grp., supra note 31, at 9-
10; Oñate, supra note 36, at 12; Angélica Arias Ortiz, Las Bacrim retan a Santos, 17 ARCA-
NOS 4, 24-27 (2012) (Colom.); Pacho Escobar, El Estado no tiene una política seria frente a 
las Bacrim, ARCO IRIS (Mar. 7, 2013) (Colom.), http://www.arcoiris.com.co/2013/03/el-
estado-no-tiene-una-politica-seria-frente-a-las-bacrim; Interview with Ariel Fernando Ávila 
Martinez, supra note 29 (mentioning extortion, illegal mining, narcotrafficking both inter-
nal and external, and contraband gasoline).  
 51. Interview with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, supra note 36. 
 52. Id.; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 87. 
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possession of property illicitly seized during the AUC era by intimi-
dating or murdering those who would seek to reclaim it.53 
 The acts of violence committed to further these businesses include 
murder, torture, massacres, disappearances, child recruitment, other 
forced recruitment, and sexual violence, as well as threats and extor-
tion.54 These acts take place in at least two distinct contexts. The first 
occurs in the process of securing territory for the purposes of conduct-
ing illegal activities, where the groups fight for control of prime ter-
rain with other groups. 55  These conflicts can leave non-members 
caught in the crossfire, mistakenly targeted, or intentionally targeted 
for cooperating with rival neoparamilitary groups. The second occurs 
in the administration of a territory under the group’s control, as part 
of an effort to generate a social order conducive to their illegal activi-
ties.56 This administration involves both maintaining power over the 
residents through threats or attacks as well as subjecting them to 
extortion and other crimes in order to economically benefit from con-
trol of the territory.57 Common targets for violence include unionists, 
human rights defenders, and AUC victims asserting their rights.58 
 53. See Los están matando, SEMANA (Mar. 14, 2009) (Colom.), 
http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/los-estan-matando/101043-3 (reporting that four 
leaders of victims groups were allegedly murdered by neoparamilitaries); Ya son 45 los 
líderes de víctimas asesinados por reclamar sus tierras; en 15 días murieron tres, EL TIEM-
PO (June 2, 2010) (Colom.), http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-7737280 
(noting that at least 45 victims of land dispossession seeking to assert their rights had been 
murdered between 2005 and June 2010).  
 54. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Report of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia, ¶¶ 32, 35, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/16/22 (Feb. 3, 2011); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 6-7; Int’l Crisis 
Grp., supra note 36, at 11; Oñate, supra note 36, at 11; Ortiz, supra note 50, at 8-9, 11-13, 
17; Escobar, supra note 50; Interview with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, supra note 36 
(mentioning homicide, collective homicide, and extortion). 
 55. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, Dinámicas del conflicto armado en la guajira y su 
impacto humanitario, ÁREA DE DINÁMICAS DEL CONFLICTO Y NEGOCIACIONES DE PAZ UNI-
DAD DE ANÁLISIS ‘SIGUIENDO EL CONFLICTO’, no. 61, June 2013, at 2, 13-14 (Co-
lom.); Ortiz, supra note 50, at 27-28. For example, the Rastrojos used violence to take 
control of large swaths of Nariño, a department on the pacific coast in the southwest corner 
of Colombia, which, along with its capital Tumaco, has become a strategic location for the 
international drug trade. Little Progress in Troubled Tumaco, Colombia, WASH. OFF. ON 
LATIN AM. (May 24, 2011), http://www.wola.org/commentary/in_troubled_tumaco_little_ 
progress. By 2011, the Rastrojos had consolidated control of this region, where both coca 
and poppy grow, which was reflected in much lower degree of violence. Interview with 
Juanita Goebertus Estrada, supra note 27.   
 56. See, e.g., García, supra note 1, at 10. 
 57. For example, the Urabeños have established militarized control of various areas, 
mostly near the Caribbean coast, through forces that resemble “private armies,” particular-
ly in the departments near the Atlantic coast. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 
69-70. 
 58. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 54, ¶ 34; HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 26, at 40. For example, the National Labor School found that 47 union-
ists were killed in 2009 and 52 in 2010. ESCUELA NACIONAL SINDICAL, INFORME NACIONAL 
DE COYUNTURA ECONÓMICA, LABORAL Y SINDICAL EN 2010–2011: PESE AL CRECIMIENTO 
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However, the groups also target ordinary citizens, such as those in-
volved in contraband, security guards, and neighborhood councils, as 
well as those who are apparently collaborating with rival groups or 
who simply happen to be in a conflict zone.59   
 The consequences of these actions are grave. Neoparamilitary 
groups are now the leading cause of human rights and humanitarian 
law violations in Colombia, committing between 30 and 50 percent of 
all abuses, 60 and almost all victims of their unilateral actions are 
civilians.61 Between 2009 and 2010, there was approximately a 40 
percent increase in the number of massacres—from around 27 to 
around 38—which the groups used to secure territory and purge their 
organizations.62 The number of massacres per year remained roughly 
constant in 2011 63 and was complemented by a steady stream of 
murders.64 During 2011, the violence from the neoparamilitaries was 
particularly notable in Cordobá, where fighting among the groups 
produced a substantial number of homicides, massacres, and forced 
displacements.65 The groups also caused a large part of new internal 
displacement, reportedly responsible for 45 percent66 of the 280,041 
persons displaced in 2010 from the armed conflict or political and 
social violence.67   
ECONÓMICO, NO MEJORA LA SITUACIÓN LABORAL DEL PAÍS 8 (2011) (Colom.),                    
available at http://www.ddhh-colombia.org/html/noticias%20sindicales/coyunturalaboral 
09052011.pdf. Additionally, between January 2007 and March 2009, the neoparamilitaries 
assassinated 59 leaders of social organizations. Romero & Arias, supra note 37, at 39. 
 59. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 54, ¶ 34; HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 26, at 45. 
 60. CINEP, supra note 2, at 3, 10-11; Cawley, supra note 2. 
 61. See, e.g., García, supra note 1, at 10. 
 62. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 54, ¶ 32 (“Of particular concern 
is the drastic increase in massacres (40 per cent), in the context of violent disputes among 
and within these groups.”) “By November, the Presidential Programme for Human Rights 
had recorded 38 massacres with 179 victims. In 2009, it recorded 27 massacres with 139 
victims.” Id. at n.12. 
 63. OBSERVATORIO DERECHOS HUMANOS (DDHH) Y DERECHO INTERNACIONAL HUMAN-
ITARIO (DIH), CIFRAS SITUACIÓN DE DERECHOS HUMANOS Y RESULTADOS OPERACIONALES  
DE LA FUERZA PÚBLICA: COMPARATIVO ENERO – OCTUBRE 2010 Y 2011, available                  
at http://quederechos.wordpress.com/2012/05/23/cifras-situacion-de-derechos-humanos-y-
resultados-operacionales-de-la-fuerza-publica/ (for the period between January and Octo-
ber, there were 32 massacres in both 2010 and 2011, which annualized, predicts about 38 
massacres). 
 64. Ortiz, supra note 50, at 17. 
 65. Id. at 31-35. For earlier episodes of violence in Cordobá related to neoparamilitar-
ies, see Víctor Negrete Barrera, La situación de Cordobá requiere con urgencia un manejo 
integral (2010), http://www.justf.org/files/primarydocs/Negrete_Cordoba.pdf. 
 66. GONZÁLEZ POSSO, supra note 28, at 9 (citing a figure from the Comisión de Se-
guimiento a la Situación de Desplazamiento).   
 67. Codhes, ¿Consolidación de qué?: Informe sobre desplazamiento, conflicto armado y 
derechos humanos en Colombia en 2010, BOLETÍN INFORMATIVO DE LA CONSULTORÍA PARA 
LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y EL DESPLAZAMIENTO, no. 77, Feb. 15, 2011 (Colom.). But see 
Reportes, Desplazamiento – Personas, RED NACIONAL DE INFORMACIÓN: INFORMACIÓN AL 
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 One of the most infamous events of 2011 in Colombia was the 
murder of two university biology students from Bogotá on vacation 
that January.68 The crime sparked a manhunt for the members of the 
Urabeños thought responsible, with several detained for the crime 
over the succeeding days. 69  A particularly severe example during 
2012 was the massacre of ten campesinos on a farm in Santa Rosa de 
Osos, Antioquia, possibly because the owner refused to make an   
extortion payment to the Rastrojos. 70  The attack was sufficiently  
severe to draw a rare direct comment from the U.N. Office of          
the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia condemning 
the massacre.71  
 To take a few other concrete examples, in 2011 there were a series 
of massacres in southern Cordobá and northern Antioquia—an area 
known as the Nudo de Paramillo.72 Violence during March 2011 left 
ten or twelve bodies scattered across a property in rural Antioquia in 
the town of Cuturú, near the border with Cordobá, with authorities 
attributing responsibility to the Rastrojos.73 In July 2011, five indig-
enous people of the Embera Zenú were murdered in Zaragoza, An-
SERVICIO DE LAS VICTIMAS (Colom.), http://rni.unidadvictimas.gov.co/?page_id=1629 (last 
updated Dec. 1, 2013) (reporting only 163,111 new displacements for the same year). How-
ever, the exact numbers are difficult to determine and those from official sources likely 
underestimate substantially the total displacement caused by neoparamilitaries. Ortiz, 
supra note 50, at 11-13. 
 68. Interview with Carlos Andrés Prieto, supra note 33 (noting that this event served 
as an alarm bell for the national government). 
 69. Cae autor intelectual de crimen de estudiantes, EL TIEMPO (Feb. 17, 2011) (Co-
lom.), http://www.eltiempo.com/archive/document/CMS-8869316; Capturan tercer implica-
do en asesinato de estudiantes de universidad Los Andes, EL ESPECTADOR (Feb. 16, 2011) 
(Colom.), http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/articulo-251273-capturan-tercer-
implicado-asesinato-de-estudiantes-de-universida; Mandos bajos de bandas criminales 
serían los asesinos de los dos biólogos bogotanos, EL HERALDO (Feb. 15, 2011) (Colom.), 
http://www.elheraldo.co/region/mandos-bajos-de-bandas-criminales-serian-los-asesinos-de-
los-dos-biologos-bogotanos. 
 70. Aumenta a $150 millones recompensa por masacre de Santa Rosa de Osos, EL 
TIEMPO (Nov. 9, 2012) (Colom.), http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/ARTICULO-WEB-
NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-12369611.html; Masacre en Santa Rosa de Osos, EL ESPECTADOR 
(Nov. 8, 2012) (Colom.), http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/masacre-santa-rosa-
de-osos-imagen-385976.  
 71. Oficina de la ONU para los Derechos Humanos condena masacre de 10 personas 
en Santa Rosa de Osos, Antioquia, LA AGENCIA DE LA ONU PARA LOS REFUGIADOS (Nov. 8, 
2012) (Colom.), available at http://www.acnur.org/t3/noticias/noticia/oficina-de-la-onu-para-
los-derechos-humanos-condena-masacre-de-10-personas-en-santa-rosa-de-osos-antioquia/. 
 72. In prior years, the Rastrojos had also committed severe violations of human rights 
as part of the consolidation, protection, and administration of its territory. The group regu-
larly committed murder and forced displacement, as well as threats and extortion to pre-
serve social control and to generate income. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 80. 
 73. Investigan masacre de 10 personas en el Bajo Cauca antioqueño, EL ESPECTADOR 
(Mar. 14, 2011) (Colom.), http://www.elespectador.com/print/256761; Gudilfredo Avendaño 
Méndez, Guerra de bandas, tras asesinato de 12 personas, EL TIEMPO (Mar. 15, 2011) (Co-
lom.), http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-4447248. 
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tioquia—near the border with the Córdoba department—also pre-
sumably by the Rastrojos.74 The August 2011 massacre in Las Pai-
las—attributed to the Rastrojos and the Paisas—left four peasants, 
apparently uninvolved in criminal activity, dead, and two others   
disappeared in a small rural town in the south of Córdoba.75 Over   
one hundred families were temporarily displaced when they fled    
the violence.76 
 This pattern continued in 2012. A group of five men, the youngest 
of which was seventeen years old, were supposedly murdered by the 
Gaitanistas subgroup of the Urabeños in Remedios, Antioquia in the 
middle of a June night, to be found the next morning by people going 
to work.77 Also in June, the Urabeños allegedly massacred four fami-
ly members in Arroyón Arriba, Córdoba, apparently because of one 
son’s involvement in illegal activities.78 Another family was massa-
cred in Campo Bello, Nariño, with the parents and a child of three 
years dead and the other child of five years wounded.79 In October, a 
group of ten members of the Urabeños allegedly massacred a father 
and three sons in Roldanillo, Valle del Cauca, all of whom were ap-
parently day laborers.80 Later the same month, the Urabeños mur-
 74. Cinco indígenas fueron asesinados en Antioquia presuntamente por exparamili-
tares, VANGUARDIA (July 1, 2011) (Colom.), http://www.vanguardia.com/historico/110956-
cinco-indigenas-fueron-asesinados-en-antioquia-presuntamente-por-exparami; Defensor del 
Pueblo denunció homicidios de 5 indígenas embera-zenú, EL TIEMPO (July 1, 2011)      
(Colom.), http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-
9778965.html. 
 75. Bandas criminales, autoras de la masacre en Tierralta, EL UNIVERSAL (Aug. 9, 
2011) (Colom.), http://www.eluniversal.com.co/print/117004. 
 76. Después de la masacre, habitantes regresan a Las Pailas, Córdoba, EL HERALDO 
(Aug. 23, 2011) (Colom.), http://www.elheraldo.co/c-rdoba/despu-s-de-la-masacre-
habitantes-regresan-a-las-pailas-34714. 
 77. Rodrigo Martínez Arango, Atribuyen a “Urabeños” masacre de Remedios, EL CO-
LOMBIANO (June 4, 2012) (Colom.), http://www.elcolombiano.com/BancoConocimiento/ 
A/atribuyen_a_urabenos_masacre_de_remedios/atribuyen_a_urabenos_masacre_de_remedios 
.asp; Masacre de cinco personas en Antioquia sería obra de ‘Los Urabeños,’ EL TIEMPO 
(June 4, 2012) (Colom.), http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-11919988. 
 78. Identifican víctimas de masacre en Córdoba, EL HERALDO (June 12, 2012)      
(Colom.), http://www.elheraldo.co/region/identifican-victimas-de-masacre-en-cordoba-70831; 
Masacre de Arroyón Arriba no quedará impune: autoridades, EL MERIDIANO DE CÓRDOBA 
(June 15, 2012) (Colom.), http://www.elmeridianodecordoba.com.co/index.php?option=com_ 
k2&view=item&id=5405:masacre-de-arroy%C3%B3n-arriba-no-quedar%C3%A1-impune-
autoridades&Itemid=120; Masacre fue retaliación entre Urabeños: Policía, EL UNIVERSAL 
(June 15, 2012) (Colom.), http://www.eluniversal.com.co/print/163712. 
 79. Bacrim masacra a una familia, HSB NOTICIAS (July 30, 2012) (Colom.), 
http://www.hsbnoticias.com/vernoticia.asp?wplaca=5626. 
 80. Asesinados cuatro miembros de una familia en el Valle, EL TIEMPO (Oct. 18, 2012) 
(Colom.), http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-12314531; Atribuyen a ‘Los 
Urabeños’ masacre de cuatro personas en Roldanillo, EL PAÍS (Oct. 18, 2012) (Colom.), 
http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/judicial/noticias/asesinados-hombre-y-sus-tres-hijos-roldanillo; 
Mueren 4 por guerra entre ‘Rastrojos’ y ‘Urabeños,’ EL NUEVO SIGLO (Oct. 18, 2012) (Co-
lom.), http://www.elnuevosiglo.com.co/articulos/10-2012-mueren-4-por-guerra-entre-rastrojos-
y-urabe%C3%B1os.html. 
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dered three miners in Segovia, Antioquia, where they were apparent-
ly seeking employment.81  
 Beyond the sheer number of mass murders, the particular meth-
ods used have often been quite disturbing. In late July 2011, the po-
lice attributed the murder of three cousins in San Bernardo del 
Viento, Córdoba to specific members of the Urabeños82 and later ac-
cused an Urabeños commander of responsibility.83 Armed men took 
the three cousins from their beds at dawn, bound them, and severely 
beat them while the rest of the people in the town remained in their 
homes.84 When the townspeople later emerged from their homes to 
see what had happened, they discovered their bodies on a local 
bridge, with one having been decapitated.85 The Urabeños committed 
similarly grisly acts in September 2012, when the tortured bodies of 
three men, two of which had been decapitated, initially appeared in 
Montería, Córdoba.86 
C.   State Response to the Neoparamilitaries 
 The Colombian National Security Council in 2011 assigned re-
sponsibility for addressing the neoparamilitary (calling them Bacrim) 
problem to both the military and to the police, in a shift from the 
prior policy that gave primary responsibility only to the police.87 Ad-
 81. Asesinaron a tres mineros que buscaban trabajo en Segovia, EL COLOMBIANO (Oct. 
28, 2012) (Colom.), http://www.elcolombiano.com/BancoConocimiento/A/asesinaron_a_ 
tres_mineros_que_buscaban_trabajo_en_segovia/asesinaron_a_tres_mineros_que_buscaban
_trabajo_en_segovia.asp. 
 82. Masacrados tres primos en San Bernardo del Viento, EL HERALDO (July 29, 2011) 
(Colom.), http://www.elheraldo.co/judicial/masacrados-tres-primos-en-san-bernardo-del-
viento-31380. 
 83. Cayó autor de masacre e San Bernardo, uno de los más buscados en Córdoba, EL 
HERALDO (Aug. 11, 2011) (Colom.), http://www.elheraldo.co/judicial/cay-autor-de-masacre-
e-san-bernardo-uno-de-los-m-s-buscados-en-c-rdoba-33117. 
 84. Torturan y asesinan a tres campesinos en San Bernardo, EL UNIVERSAL (July 29, 
2011) (Colom.), http://www.eluniversal.com.co/monteria-y-sincelejo/sucesos/torturan-y-
asesinan-tres-campesinos-en-san-bernardo-35961. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Caso de decapitados de Montería: tres hipótesis rondan el horror, EL UNIVERSAL 
(Sept. 18, 2012) (Colom.), http://www.eluniversal.com.co/monteria-y-sincelejo/sucesos/caso-
de-decapitados-de-monteria-tres-hipotesis-rondan-el-horror-91278; Surge nueva hipótesis 
del crimen, EL MERIDIANO DE SUCRE (Sept. 19, 2012) (Colom.), 
http://www.elmeridianodesucre.com.co/judicial/item/5584-surge-nueva-hipotesis-del-crimen. 
 87. OFICINA DEL ALTO ASESOR PARA LA SEGURIDAD NACIONAL, supra note 25, at 3. 
Prior to the February 2011 National Security Council decision, the National Police had the 
primary responsibility for combating the neoparamilitaries, with the Dirección de Carabi-
neros y Seguridad Rural in charge of the issue. However, the Carabinero had a limited 
territorial presence in many of the rural areas with the greatest amount of neoparamilitary 
activity, and some areas without any presence. Moreover, urban police had highly limited 
mandates, not requiring them to confront neoparamilitaries active in neighboring rural 
areas even though there was no police presence in those areas. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
supra note 26, at 94-95. 
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ditionally, it decided that it was the constitutional responsibility of 
not just the police, but also the military, to protect citizens against 
the neoparamilitaries.88 However, the Council determined that, ab-
sent the need for self-defense or defense of others, neoparamilitaries 
should be dealt with using non-lethal force as a matter both of na-
tional policy and of humanitarian law.89 The Council took the position 
that, as a matter of law, the neoparamilitaries are not parties to the 
Colombian non-international armed conflict, although it recognized 
that there was space for disagreement on this assessment, as the ICRC 
had determined that the Rastrojos and the Urabeños were parties.90 
 The resulting strategy combined an emphasis on capturing and 
prosecuting neoparamilitary leaders while also engaging in a series 
of targeted security operations, called Troya. 91  The original Plan 
Troya for Córdoba was announced in February 2012, just after the 
murders of the two university students. The official goal was to cut 
off funding to the neoparamilitaries by closing the main drug traffick-
ing corridor through Córdoba, using a combination of the army, navy, 
air force, and police.92 This plan was quickly complemented with oth-
  During this period, the military was permitted to assist the police in confronting 
the neoparamilitaries, but only on request to a military Advisory Group under the armed 
forces commander. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Directiva Permanente No. 208, 
§§ 3(b)(1)(b), 3(b)(6)(f) (2008). The Advisory Group, which became known as the Comité 
Ejecutivo, had the responsibility to decide which groups would be the objectives of military 
operations and what level of force would be used against those targets. Id. In 2009, it de-
termined that the military could use lethal force against at least three of the neoparamili-
tary groups, as they constituted parties to the armed conflict. Interview with Juanita Goe-
bertus Estrada, supra note 36. However, these policies underwent substantial change 
following current President Santos’ exit from his then-position as Minister of Defense in 
May 2009. Id. 
 88. Interview with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, supra note 27. 
 89. OFICINA DEL ALTO ASESOR PARA LA SEGURIDAD NACIONAL, supra note 25, at 3; see 
also Interview with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, supra note 36. For an interesting discus-
sion of the applicable legal regime in moderately ambiguous circumstances and an analysis 
of a former Colombian approach, see Constantin von der Groeben, The Conflict in Colombia 
and the Relationship Between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Practice: 
Analysis of the New Operational Law of the Colombian Armed Forces, 16 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 141 (2011). 
 90. OFICINA DEL ALTO ASESOR PARA LA SEGURIDAD NACIONAL, supra note 25, at 4 
(claiming the groups are not properly hierarchical, since the national commanders are 
unable to give orders to local units, with limited territorial control and capacity for sus-
tained military operations). In addition, the National Security Council decided that the 
neoparamilitaries would not be eligible for demobilization. Id. at 3. However, victims of the 
groups would not be treated as victims of ordinary crime, but instead would be entitled to 
government humanitarian programs normally reserved for victims of armed conflict. Inter-
view with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, supra note 36. 
 91. Oñate, supra note 36, at 3, 6-7. 
 92. Así será ‘Troya’ contra las Bacrim, EL TIEMPO (Feb. 7, 2011) (Colom.), 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-4383001; Cuatro mil hombres ejectuan 
la ‘Operación Troya,’ EL ESPECTADOR (Feb. 7, 2011) (Colom.), http://www.elespectador.com/ 
noticias/judicial/articulo-249375-cuatro-mil-hombres-ejectuan-operacion-troya. 
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ers for similarly problematic regions: Troya Pacífico in May 201193 
and Troya Chocó in July 2011.94 A second round of Troya operations 
began with Operation Troya II in Córdoba in July 2012, with a new 
focus on illegal mining and extortion and increased use of criminal 
investigation and intelligence gathering.95 To this was added a com-
parable operation for Northeastern Antioquia in October 201296 and 
Plan Troya Tayrona for the Magdelena department in November 2012.97 
 The use of the Troya security operations has been complemented 
with a criminal justice approach focused on group leaders, but also 
frequently applied to other members. The Bacrim Unit of the Prose-
cutor’s Office98 has lead the effort to implement this criminal justice 
approach to combating the neoparamilitaries by closely coordinating 
with police and military actions. Through involvement in the plan-
ning stages of these operations, the Bacrim Unit has tried to assure 
that they strategically target those persons whose capture will be 
most helpful in dismantling the organizations. In many cases this 
has meant a focus on high value targets, often leaders of the various 
neoparamilitary groups, but sometimes including lower-level mem-
bers who help the Unit develop intelligence and cases against superi-
ors.99 The Bacrim Unit has received increasing levels of resources to 
carry out this role: Law 1453 nearly tripled the number of prosecu-
tors from the twenty-five in place in late 2011, to a total of seventy-
three, and added approximately 100 judicial police investigators.100   
 Following the decision to coordinate prosecution with security 
force actions, there was a substantial shift in the patterns of charging 
 93. Presidente Santos lanzó Plan Troya en el Pacífico, EL TIEMPO (May 5, 2011) (Co-
lom.), http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-4537557. 
 94. Crean nueva zona para combatir a las bacrim, EL TIEMPO (July 26, 2011) (Colom.), 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-4708579. 
 95. ‘Me ha faltado apersonarme de la seguridad en las regiones’: Santos, EL TIEMPO 
(July 7, 2012) (Colom.), http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_ 
INTERIOR-12009572.html; “Personalmente me ha faltado meterme más en la seguridad de 
cada región”: Santos, SEMANA (July 7, 2012) (Colom.), http://www.semana.com/nacion/ 
articulo/personalmente-ha-faltado-meterme-mas-seguridad-cada-region-santos/260807-3. 
 96. Mindefensa activa grupo especial para luchar contra la minería ilegal, EL ES-
PECTADOR (Oct. 13, 2012) (Colom.), http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/articulo-
381089-mindefensa-activa-grupo-especial-luchar-contra-mineria-ilegal; Se combatirá la 
minería ilegal con 386 soldados y policías, SEMANA (Oct. 15, 2012) (Colom.), 
http://m.semana.com/nacion/articulo/se-combatira-mineria-ilegal-386-soldados-policias/266 
379-3. 
 97. ‘Plan Troya Tayrona’ va contra las bacrim, EL TIEMPO (Nov. 26, 2012) (Colom.), 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-5845856. 
 98. Officially entitled “Unidad Nacional de Decongestión y Apoyo Contra las Bandas 
Criminales.” 
 99. Interview with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, supra note 27. 
 100. L. 1453, junio 24, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.); Interview with Juanita 
Goebertus Estrada, supra note 36; Interview with Government Official, in Bogotá, Colom. 
(Jan. 2012). 
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and convicting those alleged members of neoparamilitary groups cap-
tured by the public security forces.101 While between January and 
October 2010 only 53 percent of those captured as members of neo-
paramilitary groups were charged with conspiracy and only 12 per-
cent were convicted, between January and October 2011 100 percent 
were charged with conspiracy and 47 percent were convicted.102 Alt-
hough the Bacrim Unit increased the percentage of detained neopar-
amilitary group members who were charged and convicted during the 
first half of 2011, only 36 percent of all captures of alleged neopara-
military group members were in cooperation with this unit.103 How-
ever, while more than 13,000 neoparamilitary group members have 
reportedly been arrested since 2006, these arrests do not appear       
to have had a substantial effect on the security situation.104 Instead, 
the approach has fragmented the national unity of the groups           
to some degree, while leaving them with much the same level of   
military capacity.105 
 Despite official initiatives to combat neoparamilitaries, there are 
reasons to doubt whether all parts of the state security forces are 
actively and effectively opposing the neoparamilitaries. During the 
Uribe government, the military frequently failed to take actions 
against the neoparamilitaries despite having the opportunity, the 
capacity, and the general legal authority to do so. Although the mili-
tary had not been authorized to use lethal force against a particular 
group unless it received explicit authorization or self-defense re-
quired such force, it had authorization to protect the civilian popula-
tion in accordance with its constitutional duty.106 Despite this, Hu-
man Rights Watch found that local military commanders at times 
asserted that the responsibility for combating the neoparamilitaries 
lay solely with the police.107 Even though the military might have had 
 101. See Interview with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, supra note 36. 
 102. OFICINA DEL ALTO ASESOR PARA LA SEGURIDAD NACIONAL, supra note 25, at 9; 
OFICINA DEL ALTO ASESOR PARA LA SEGURIDAD NATIONAL, ANÁLISIS DE LOS AVANCES: 
CIFRAS (2011) (the 2010 numbers are from PONAL – Seguridad Rural, while the 2011 
numbers are from the Fiscalía). 
 103. OFICINA DEL ALTO ASESOR PARA LA SEGURIDAD NATIONAL, supra note 102. While 
the national government does not closely oversee them, local prosecutors also commonly 
prosecute various crimes committed by members of the neoparamilitary groups. As of early 
2012, there was no consolidated data about nationwide prosecutions that includes these 
local efforts nor has there been any specific effort to expand the local prosecutions. Howev-
er, the government has tried to ensure that the expanded national Bacrim Unit will prose-
cute cases involving neoparamilitary group members. Interview with Juanita Goebertus 
Estrada, supra note 27. 
 104. Ortiz, supra note 50, at 8-9, 18-19 (citing General Oscar Naranjo, director of the 
national police, for the number of arrests). 
 105. Oñate, supra note 36, at 6-9. 
 106. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 94. 
 107. Id. at 96. 
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a significant presence in an area substantially exceeding that of the 
police, it would not necessarily have felt the need to take action to 
protect civilians.108   
 Although both the police and the military now have official re-
sponsibility, elements of the military have resisted participating in 
the fight against the neoparamilitaries. In Córdoba, for example, 
despite the neoparamilitaries’ extensive presence and violent actions, 
some parts of the military have allegedly been infiltrated by the 
groups and are reluctant to confront them.109 But beyond allegations 
of infiltration, since February 2011 the military has resisted assum-
ing responsibility for attending to the problem of neoparamilitaries. 
Some officers say that the military should not be involved in what is 
fundamentally a crime-control issue appropriately left to the police, 
particularly since the neoparamilitaries are not parties to the conflict 
and cannot be demobilized. Other officers claim they would like to 
fight the neoparamilitaries but that they must be allowed to use le-
thal force, particularly since the ICRC determined that some neopar-
amilitary groups are parties to the conflict.110  
D.   Corruption of State Officials 
 Efforts at combating the neoparamilitaries are hindered by exten-
sive toleration of or collaboration with the groups by state officials at 
the local level, including police and military officers up to the rank of 
colonel. 111 There is widespread agreement among government offi-
cials and civil society representatives that the neoparamilitaries have 
succeeded in extensively corrupting members of many different state 
security forces, including the police, the military, the former Admin-
istrative Security Department (DAS), and the Prosecutor’s Office, as 
well as political leaders at local and regional levels.112  
 The involvement has ranged from simply ignoring activities of a 
neoparamilitary group in a particular area to assisting in protecting 
and moving drug shipments.113 For example, police in Urabá (north-
 108. See id. 
 109. Interview with Ariel Fernando Ávila Martinez, supra note 29. 
 110. Interview with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, supra note 27. 
 111. Id.; Interview with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, supra note 36. 
 112. OFICINA DEL ALTO ASESOR PARA LA SEGURIDAD NACIONAL, supra note 25, at 10; 
Oñate, supra note 36, at 9-10; María del Rosario Arrázola, Se abre capítulo bacrimpolítica, 
EL ESPECTADOR (June 2, 2013) (Colom.), http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/ 
articulo-425485-se-abre-capitulo-bacrimpolitica; Marguerite Cawley, Accused Colombia 
Governor Highlights BACRIM Connections, INSIGHT CRIME (May 26, 2013) (Colom.), 
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/colombia-governor-bacrim-politics-guajira; 
Escobar, supra note 36. 
 113. Elyssa Pachico, Colombia’s New Generation Drug Gangs: The Power to Corrupt, 
INSIGHT CRIME (Aug. 15, 2011) (Colom.), http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/ 
1401-colombias-new-generation-drug-gangs-the-power-to-corrupt. 
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western Antioquia) have at times ignored the presence of the neopar-
amilitaries, letting them pass through towns or hold community 
meetings unmolested.114 In fact, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights concluded that these groups were operating freely     
in parts of Chocó (near the border with Antioquia) with significant 
military presence.115   
 At the other extreme, the public security forces have also been 
found to collaborate more actively with the neoparamilitaries. In 
Urabá, the military, police, and prosecutors were reported to leave an 
area regularly in advance of operations by the Urabeños.116 There 
were similar accusations about the relation between public officials 
and the ERPAC in Meta, as well as other neoparamilitary groups in 
Nariño.117 In several recent events, active members of the military 
have been caught transporting drugs on behalf of neoparamilitary 
groups.118 Despite the range of corruption, perhaps the most serious 
example is the provision of information to the neoparamilitaries.119 
For example, in 2008 the leader of ERPAC, alias Cuchillo, repeatedly 
evaded attempts at capture in Meta despite an extensive effort to 
locate him, including strong intelligence networks. The commonly 
accepted explanation is that he had links within the security forces 
that provided him with the information necessary to escape.120 
 In recent years, the obvious extent of the links between members 
of security forces and the neoparamilitaries has become sufficiently 
severe as to provoke large-scale investigations and arrests. Following 
the murder of Rastrojos commander Angel de Jesus Pacheco in 2011, 
thought responsible for the previously-mentioned murders of ten or 
twelve individuals on a rural ranch in northern Antioquia, authori-
ties received copies of his payroll records indicating massive payouts 
 114. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 101. 
 115. COMISIÓN INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, INFORME SOBRE LA VISITA AL 
TERRENO EN RELACIÓN CON LAS MEDIDAS PROVISIONALES ORDENADAS A FAVOR DE LOS MIEM-
BROS DE LAS COMUNIDADES CONSTITUIDAS POR EL CONSEJO COMUNITARIO DEL JIGUAMIANDÓ 
Y LAS FAMILIAS DEL CURBARADÓ, MUNICIPIO DE CARMEN DEL DARIÉN, DEPARTAMENTO DEL 
CHOCÓ, REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA ¶ 82 (Feb. 20, 2009), available at http://www.cidh.org/ 
countryrep/MPColombia2.20.09.sp.htm. 
 116. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 99. 
 117. Id. at 102-03. 
 118. Oñate, supra note 36, at 9-10; Pacho Escobar, El Estado no ha podido con           
las Bacrim y ganan “Los Urabeños,” ARCO IRIS (Mar. 7, 2013) (Colom.), 
http://www.arcoiris.com.co/2013/03/el-estado-no-ha-podido-con-las-bacrim-y-ganan-los-urabenos; 
Interview with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, supra note 36. 
 119. Interview with Ariel Fernando Ávila Martinez, supra note 29. 
 120. Conflict Dynamics and Peace Negotiations Area, supra note 19, at 4 (reporting 
that alias Cuchillo escaped capture through official complicity); Interview with Carlos 
Andrés Prieto, supra note 33. 
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to state security officials.121 This event provoked a series of responses 
from national officials.122 That August the Minister of Defense, Ro-
drigo Rivera, confirmed that the Ministry was investigating members 
of the armed forces and the police for possible links to neoparamili-
taries, with particular concern expressed about such links at the local 
level.123 That same month the former National Police Director, Gen-
eral Oscar Naranjo, ordered an investigation into links between po-
lice in the Córdoba department and the Rastrojos,124 having noted 
that 2011 was the worst year yet in terms of police corruption.125   
 Currently, there is growing consensus that the neoparamilitaries 
pose a great risk of, and are likely in the process of, co-opting elected 
officials at different levels. To take a prominent recent example, the 
governor of Guajira, a Colombian department on the Atlantic coast, 
has been accused of working with neoparamilitaries.126 The problem 
is likely more widespread: Nuevo Arco Iris reports that regional poli-
ticians frequently are attracted by the economic support the neopar-
amilitaries can provide for election campaigns.127 In light of suspected 
links between neoparamilitaries and politicians, the Supreme Court 
of Colombia recently decided to expand its investigation of politicians 
with ties to the former paramilitaries to include those with ties to the 
neoparamilitaries.128 The scrutiny has apparently already had some 
results—although the form of those results is not public—and has 
 121. Los uniformados en la nómina del narco alias ‘Sebastián’: Integrantes de DAS,     
el Ejército y la Policía estarían al servicio del ex jefe de ‘los Rastrojos,’ EL TIEMPO (Aug.    
12, 2011) (Colom.), http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-10141027; Pachico, 
supra note 113. In January 2011 alone, the police Criminal Investigation Section (Sijín) in 
Bagre received 10 million pesos, the Army’s Guala Atlantica 15 million, the local DAS 15 
million, the city police in Caucasia, Antioquia 30 million and the Caucasia Sijín 35 million. 
Id. 
 122. Mindefensa confirma que varios uniformados son investigados por posibles      




 123. Id. 
 124. General Naranjo ordenó esclarecer supuestos vínculos de policías con Los Rastro-
jos, EL HERALDO (Aug. 3, 2011) (Colom.), http://www.elheraldo.co/regi-n/general-naranjo-
orden-esclarecer-supuestos-v-nculos-de-polic-con-los-rastrojos-32037. By early August, 
these new initiatives had resulted in the arrest of two or three soldiers and six police in 
northern Antioquia for alleged involvement with the Rastrojos. Capturan siete policías y 
tres militares por nexos con Los Rastrojos, EL ESPECTADOR (Aug. 4, 2011) (Colom.), 
http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/capturan-siete-policias-y-tres-militares-nexos 
-los-rast-articulo-289355; Correos, vínculo de uniformados con las bacrim, EL TIEMPO (Aug. 
4, 2011) (Colom.), http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA 
_INTERIOR-10094909.html. 
 125. Interview with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, supra note 36. 
 126. Cawley, supra note 112. 
 127. Escobar, supra note 36; cf. Oñate, supra note 36. 
 128. Arrázola, supra note 112. 
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expanded to include a dedicated group of auxiliary magistrates        
as well as fifty to one hundred investigators from the national       
prosecutor’s office.129 
III.   RESPONSIBILITY FOR INADEQUATE PROTECTION 
 This part will present the current responsibility rule for state fail-
ure to protect that has emerged in the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights.130 The exposition will focus on the explicit rule these courts 
have developed, despite the fact that they have often applied the rule 
flexibly, not following its literal terms. It will explain how the rule 
establishes a threshold requirement for court review as well as a 
substantive standard for state protection efforts. The rule will then 
be applied to the situation of neoparamilitaries in Colombia, arguing 
that under the literal terms of the rule, state responsibility for failure 
to protect against these groups is excluded under many circumstanc-
es. While the international jurisprudence allows for state responsibil-
ity for failure to protect in response to violations of various rights, 
including to personal integrity and freedom,131 this part will focus on 
the review requirement developed for the right to life in particular. 
 129. Id. 
 130. For an extensive overview of the international jurisprudence concerning state 
responsibility based on actions of non-state actors, see DAVID L. ATTANASIO, MANUAL DE 
JURISPRUDENCIA INTERNACIONAL: RESPONSABILIDAD ESTATAL FRENTE A LOS ACTOS DE 
GRUPOS VIOLENTOS PRIVADOS (forthcoming 2014). For a briefer introduction to the topic, 
not limited to failure to protect, see Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Human Rights Violations 
Arising from Conduct of Non-State Actors, 11 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 21 (2005). Felipe 
Medina discusses parts of the Inter-American Court jurisprudence in Felipe Medina Ardi-
la, La responsabilidad internacional del Estado por actos de particulares: análisis juris-
prudencial interamericano, in DEBATE INTERAMERICANO, VOL. 1, at 83 (Juana Inés Acosta 
López et al. eds., 2009). Also helpful are analyses of international state responsibility 
standards surrounding the International Court of Justice’s Genocide decision. See Alberto 
Alvarez-Jimenez, International State Responsibility for Acts of Non-State Actors: The Re-
cent Standards Set by the International Court of Justice in Genocide and Why the WTO 
Appellate Body Should Not Embrace Them, 35 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 1 (2007); Anto-
nio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on 
Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 649 (2007); Marko Milanović, State Responsibility 
for Genocide, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 553 (2006); see also Stephanie Farrior, State Responsibility 
for Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Actors, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 299 (1998); 
Carsten Hoppe, Passing the Buck: State Responsibility for Private Military Companies, 19 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 989 (2008); Alexis P. Kontos, “Private” Security Guards: Privatized Force 
and State Responsibility Under International Human Rights Law, 4 NON-ST. ACTORS & 
INT’L L. 199 (2004). 
 131. See, e.g., Storck v. Germany, 2005-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 111, ¶ 102 (for the right to 
liberty); Z and Others v. United Kingdom, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 73 (for the right to 
personal integrity). 
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A.   Current Responsibility Rule for Failure to Protect 
 According to the responsibility rule that the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights    
apply, the state is responsible for a violation of the right to life as      
a result of acts of private persons or entities when: (i) the acts result 
in the victim’s death, (ii) the authorities know or should know        
that there is a real and immediate risk to the life of the victim or 
members of a group to which the victim belongs, (iii) they do not take 
reasonable measures to prevent the risk from materializing, and (iv) 
the omitted measures would have had a reasonable possibility of pre-
venting the victim’s death.132 The two courts appear to differ over 
whether this rule merely establishes responsibility or whether it   
additionally renders the private person or entity’s action attributable 
to the state.133 However, they are in general agreement that the re-
sponsibility is founded in the state’s general obligation to safeguard, 
ensure, or secure the substantive right to life of those within the 
state’s jurisdiction.134 
 132. See Osman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23452/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 116 (1998) 
(“[W]here there is an allegation that the authorities have violated their positive obligation 
to protect the right to life in the context of their above-mentioned duty to prevent and 
suppress offences against the person . . . it must be established to its satisfaction that the 
authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immedi-
ate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third 
party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged 
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.”) (but not finding a violation of 
the right to life); see also Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 124 (Jan. 31, 2006); Valle Jaramil-
lo v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
192, ¶ 90 (Nov. 27, 2008). 
 133. See, e.g., Valle Jaramillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 192, ¶ 92. 
 134. The three major treaties establishing basic civil and political rights establish 
general state obligations requiring that everyone within either its jurisdiction or territory 
enjoys their treaty rights. See American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, 
Costa Rica” art. 1(1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into 
force July 18, 1978); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); European Convention on Human 
Rights art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 5 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). The European 
Court of Human Rights has based responsibility for failure to protect, when life was at 
issue, on Article 2(1) of the European Convention, which requires states “to take appropri-
ate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction.” See, e.g., Osman, App. No. 
23452/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 115. The Inter-American Court, in turn, has founded responsibil-
ity for failure to protect against violations of the right to life on the combination of Ameri-
can Convention Article 1(1), establishing the state duty to ensure the convention rights, 
and Article 4(1), establishing the right to life. See, e.g., Pueblo Bello, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 140, ¶¶ 105-06. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has decided 
that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires that states take 
protective measures, at least with respect to life, via Article 6, defining the right to life, 
sometimes in conjunction with Article 2, establishing the state obligation to ensure the 
Covenant rights. See, e.g., Herrera Rubio v. Co1ombia, Comm. No. 161/1983 (Nov. 2, 1987), 
U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/43/40) at 190, ¶ 10.3 (1988); Barbato v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 
84/1981 (Oct. 21, 1982), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/38/40) at 124, ¶ 9.2 (1983). 
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 The first element of the responsibility rule constitutes a threshold 
requirement for court review of the efforts that the state took to pro-
tect. For the court to review protection efforts, there must have been 
a real and immediate risk, of which state officials knew or should 
have known, to the life of the individual.135 The risk could be directed 
at some group, likely small, that included the victim and need not 
have singled out the victim in particular.136  
 In contrast, the second element establishes substantive review 
standards for the particular efforts that the state took to protect the 
victims. In general terms, the efforts must be reasonable. Reasonable 
efforts to protect include implementing positive and specific opera-
tional measures in response to the particular risk and establishing a 
general system of protection for individuals’ lives. 137  Operational 
measures are responsive to the particular risk facing a person and 
are not broad policies for addressing the risks in a society, so they 
could range from providing a bodyguard to investigating the 
threat.138 In turn, the general system of protection will include an 
effective criminal justice system, capable of the “prevention, suppres-
sion, and sanctioning” of violations,139 as well as other systems neces-
sary for effective responses to risks.140 
B.   Historical Development of the Responsibility Rule 
 State responsibility for failure to protect had something of a pre-
history in the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which de-
termined that a state could be responsible for failure to take 
measures to protect against violence from individuals or private enti-
ties, at least when the state is otherwise implicated in the violation. 
In an early decision, Barbato v. Uruguay, the Human Rights Com-
mittee determined that a state violates the Covenant when an in-
mate commits suicide or dies, at least if the authorities took no pro-
tective measures for an act or omission.141 Another early decision, 
 135. Osman, App. No. 23452/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 116; Pueblo Bello, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 124. 
 136. Koku v. Turkey, App. No. 27305/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 131 (2005); Pueblo Bello, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 124. 
 137. See Osman, App. No. 23452/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 116.  
 138. See Barrios v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 237, ¶ 124 (Nov. 24, 2011); González v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 283 (Nov. 
16, 2009); Kılıç v. Turkey, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 75, ¶ 76; Osman, App. No. 23452/94, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. ¶ 115; Pueblo Bello, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶¶ 139-40.  
 139. Osman, App. No. 23452/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 115; cf. González, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 285. 
 140. González, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 285. 
 141. Barbato v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 84/1981 (Oct. 21, 1982), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 
(A/38/40) at 124, ¶ 9.2 (1983). 
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Herrera Rubio v. Colombia, stated that, under Article 6 in combina-
tion with Article 2, the State must “take specific and effective 
measures to prevent the disappearance of individuals” and, by impli-
cation, to prevent murder, in circumstances where soldiers were 
probably responsible.142  
 However, responsibility for failure to protect blossomed in the 
international human rights courts in a line of cases that began with 
the Inter-American Court’s decision in Velasquez Rodriguez:   
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially 
not directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the   
act of a private person or because the person responsible has not 
been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the 
State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due 
diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by 
the Convention.143 
In this case, the Court was particularly concerned with preventing 
the state of Honduras from escaping responsibility for a practice of 
forced disappearance, where the practice itself concealed evidence of 
state responsibility. The European Court of Human Rights similarly 
adopted a state duty to protect and the possibility of responsibility for 
failures in L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, which analyzed the scope of 
the right to life. Without finding the state responsible, it announced 
that these rights impose both positive and negative obligations, re-
quiring the State “to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of 
those within its jurisdiction.”144  
 The European Court of Human Rights refined the general princi-
ple—that states can be responsible for failure to protect—into the 
rule that both the European Court and the Inter-American Court 
currently apply, on the grounds that the enforceable obligation is not 
absolute but is limited to avoid excessive interference with the 
 142. Herrera Rubio v. Co1ombia, Comm. No. 161/1983 (Nov. 2 1987), U.N. Doc. Supp. 
No. 40 (A/43/40) at 190, ¶ 10.3 (1988) (but not clarifying whether the obligation is limited 
to actions of state authorities, given that it never takes a clear factual position).  
 143. Velázquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 
¶ 172 (July 29, 1988); see also id. ¶ 166 (“The second obligation of the States Parties is to 
“ensure” the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention to every 
person subject to its jurisdiction. This obligation implies the duty of the States Parties to 
organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which 
public power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full 
enjoyment of human rights. As a consequence of this obligation, the States must prevent, 
investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention . . . .”). 
 144. L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23413/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 36 (1998) (estab-
lishing the positive obligation for the right to life but not finding a violation); see also A. v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 25599/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 22 (1998) (establishing the positive 
obligation for the right to personal integrity); Storck v. Germany, 2005-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 111, 
¶ 102 (“The State is therefore obliged to take measures providing effective protection of 
vulnerable persons . . . .”) (establishing the positive obligation for the right to liberty). 
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state. 145  Osman v. United Kingdom established that the court-
enforced state obligation to protect and any associated responsibility 
must take into account “the difficulties involved in policing modern 
societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational 
choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources.”146 
This judgment considered violence against a student’s family by a 
deranged teacher in the context of a generally law-abiding society 
where it was unreasonable to impose a broad state protective obliga-
tion. As a result, the Court limited the review of state protection ef-
forts to circumstances in which there was a real and immediate risk 
to specific persons, and state officials knew or should have known of 
that risk.147 The Inter-American Court adopted this rule and its un-
derlying justification in the case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre, con-
cerning the Colombian state’s failure to protect against a massacre 
by paramilitary groups.148 
C.   Current Responsibility Rule and Protection Against MCOs 
 The current responsibility rule likely does not allow for court re-
view of state protection efforts against much MCO violence, at least 
when it resembles that of the neoparamilitaries in Colombia. While 
state authorities in Colombia may sometimes have the knowledge 
required for review and responsibility, there is a significant range of 
situations in which they do not. Neoparamilitary groups have regu-
larly co-opted officials at many levels of government through pay-
ments or other inducements, leaving a network of officials positively 
disposed toward these groups.149 Some of these officials may have 
knowledge of or directly participate in illegal activities, including the 
 145. Osman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23452/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 116 (1998) 
(“[S]uch an obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or 
disproportionate burden on the authorities.”) (but not finding a violation of the right to 
life). 
 146. Id. In subsequent cases, the European Court required creation of a legislative and 
administrative framework that the State may not impose an impossible or disproportionate 
burden, reiterating an idea of Osman. Budayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 11339/02, 21166/02, 
11673/02, and 11343/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 135 (2008).  
 147. See Osman, App. No. 23452/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 116.  
 148. Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 124 (Jan. 31, 2006) (citing Kılıç v. Turkey, 2000-III 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 75, ¶¶ 62-63; Osman, App. No. 23452/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 115-16); see also 
Barrios v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 237, ¶¶ 123-24 (Nov. 24, 2011); González v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 280 (Nov. 16, 
2009); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 155 (Mar. 29, 2006); Valle Jaramillo v. 
Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 192, 
¶ 90 (Nov. 27, 2008); Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 188 (Aug. 24, 2010). 
 149. See OFICINA DEL ALTO ASESOR PARA LA SEGURIDAD NACIONAL, supra note 25, at 10. 
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commission of acts of violence. There are reports that in Urabá, Me-
ta, and Nariño the public security forces have regularly left an area 
prior to actions by neoparamilitary groups, strongly indicating that 
state officials had knowledge of the impending actions.150 If they did, 
their knowledge of the imminent acts of violence would likely be suf-
ficient to fulfill this element for state responsibility. 
 However, even when neoparamilitaries have corrupted the gov-
ernment or security officials, the officials may not possess sufficient 
knowledge of impending violent acts to allow court review of state 
protection efforts to satisfy the current rule. Sometimes officials 
simply ignore neoparamilitary activity, letting them go about their 
business without any interference.151 Such tolerance does not by itself 
indicate that state officials have knowledge of particular future vio-
lent actions that the groups will commit. Other times, officials active-
ly work with neoparamilitary groups to facilitate their illegal activi-
ties, such as by protecting and assisting with drug trafficking or by 
providing information that may enable them to avoid other law en-
forcement efforts.152 These forms of active involvement by themselves 
do not support the inference that the officials have access to infor-
mation about impending violent actions, although providing neopar-
amilitaries with information to avoid law enforcement actions might 
constitute an independent violation of the state obligation to investi-
gate and punish serious human rights violations. 
 Finally, security forces have reportedly failed to oppose or confront 
neoparamilitary groups who were active in the area of operations of 
the security forces. Even absent corruption, some elements of the 
military have taken the view that neoparamilitaries are a problem 
for the police to address, even when the military has a much more 
substantial presence in a region than the police.153 At the same time, 
local police forces have on occasion failed to take measures to prevent 
neoparamilitary groups from operating in surrounding areas, some-
times advancing the explanation that they do not technically have 
responsibility for the area where the groups are operating. There is 
no indication that the security forces involved in these events have 
knowledge of impending violence. 
 Beyond the lack of specific knowledge of impending violence, the 
victims of neoparamilitaries often do not fall into any group with a 
particularly elevated risk to their lives. Certainly a person is more 
 150. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 99, 102. 
 151. Id.; COMISIÓN INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, supra note 115, ¶ 82. 
 152. Pachico, supra note 113; Interview with Ariel Fernando Ávila Martinez, supra 
note 29. 
 153. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 94-96; see also Interview with Juanita 
Goebertus Estrada, supra note 27; Interview with Ariel Fernando Ávila Martinez, supra 
note 29. 
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likely to be a victim if he or she falls into certain categories. In gen-
eral, it is dangerous to be a leader of any sort of social movement or 
other group that appears to threaten the power of the neoparamili-
taries or their allies. Labor leaders, human rights advocates, and 
victim’s rights leaders have all been targeted by these organizations, 
making it dangerous to be at the head of any social movement in Co-
lombia.154 But the striking thing about the pattern of violence in con-
temporary Colombia is that it extends beyond these predictable and 
unfortunately normal targets. The violence has reached members of 
indigenous and afro-Colombian communities, even those not particu-
larly active in promoting their rights, as well as ordinary campesin-
os.155 It has even reached members of the Bogotá elite, such as the 
two university students murdered in Córdoba.156   
 In general, there is no one group targeted for violence, the 
knowledge of which might fulfill this element of state responsibility. 
Given the ecumenical nature of the violence, unpredictable in its tar-
gets, many of the victims would find it hard to argue that they were 
part of a group at special risk of violence.157 While other victims, such 
as leaders of social movements, are at elevated risk of violence, even 
they form a huge group, undermining satisfaction of the threshold 
requirement for review and responsibility that the victim be at a par-
ticularly elevated risk of violence. 
IV.   THE CURRENT RESPONSIBILITY RULE IN THE JURISPRUDENCE 
 This part will argue that, despite the rather narrow formulation of 
the official responsibility rule developed in the jurisprudence, the 
human rights courts have shown substantial flexibility in applying 
the threshold requirement for court review of protection efforts when 
called for by the circumstances. They have been particularly disposed 
to loosen the threshold for review in situations approximating inter-
nal armed conflict where the state failed to protect against actions  
by violent groups not acting in opposition to the state, and in some 
cases tacitly allied with it. The European Court made such moves in 
a series of cases that emerged from the PKK conflict between the 
Turkish government and Kurdish rebel groups, while the Inter-
American Court has flexibly applied the standard in, among others, 
cases arising from the Colombian civil conflict. I will consider the 
jurisprudence of these two courts in turn and then conclude with a 
 154. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 54, ¶ 34; ESCUELA NACIONAL 
SINDICAL, supra note 58, at 1, 8; Romero & Arias, supra note 37, at 39. 
 155. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 54, ¶ 34; HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 26, at 45. 
 156. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
 157. See González v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 282 (Nov. 16, 2009). 
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diagnosis of the reasons why the courts were willing to expand re-
view in these circumstances.158 
A.   European Court Jurisprudence on PKK Conflict in Turkey 
 Perhaps the most obvious example of a court expanding the scope 
of its review was when the European Court of Human Rights loos-
ened the threshold requirement of the standard responsibility rule 
when considering the circumstances in Turkey. Evaluating a series of 
extrajudicial executions in the context of the Workers Party of Kurdi-
stan (PKK) conflict, the European Court decided that it could review 
state protection efforts not only when the state had or should have 
had knowledge of a real and imminent danger to a specific individual, 
but also when it simply had knowledge of such a danger to a group of 
individuals.159 Although Osman imposed a threshold requirement for 
responsibility that there be a risk to an identified person or per-
sons,160 the cases on the PKK conflict loosened the strictness of the 
requirement: the risk need not be a risk to the life of the victim in 
particular, but simply a risk to a group to which the victim belongs. 
This change allowed the Court to find Turkey responsible on the ba-
sis of the deaths of people who were members of groups known to be 
targeted by pro-state death squads, such as journalists or suspected 
PKK sympathizers. 
 However, even with the threshold requirement relaxed to include 
situations in which the state had knowledge of the risk to multiple 
individuals, the Court’s application of the rule may still have 
stretched its literal terms.161 For example, the risk to a journalist in 
Kılıç v. Turkey was sufficient to allow court review because journal-
ists, producers, and distributors for the victim’s newspaper had been 
subject to attacks.162 Mere involvement in banned political activity, 
such as union membership, met the threshold requirement in Akkoç 
v. Turkey.163 The Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey court reviewed protection 
efforts because the victim, a physician, was believed to have treated 
 158. For useful analyses of state responsibility in the context of international terrorist 
groups, see generally Derek Jinks, State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed 
Groups, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 83 (2003), and Vincent-Joël Proulx, Babysitting Terrorists: 
Should States Be Strictly Liable for Failing to Prevent Transborder Attacks?, 23 BERKELEY 
J. INT’L L. 615 (2005).  
 159. See Koku v. Turkey, App. No. 27305/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 131 (2005). 
 160. Osman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23452/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 116 (1998). 
 161. The element of state knowledge of the risk was not important in this series of 
cases because Turkey had clear knowledge of the risk to these categories of persons who 
were the targets of attacks. But see Koku, App. No. 27305/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 133 (in which 
the authorities had specific knowledge of the risk to the victim from a report of his disap-
pearance).  
 162. Kılıç v. Turkey, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 75, ¶ 66. 
 163. Akkoç v. Turkey, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 389, ¶ 81. 
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PKK guerrillas. 164 Most recently, the court in Koku v. Turkey re-
viewed protection efforts for a victim whose political party had been 
targeted nationwide for kidnappings and murders, even though he 
was only the president of a local branch.165 In none of these cases 
would it be fair to say that the risk to the particular victim was ex-
traordinarily high or that the group of at-risk individuals was partic-
ularly limited. While it may well have been extremely likely that 
some individual in the at-risk groups would be murdered, it does not 
appear to have been particularly likely that the specific victim would be. 
 Instead, the Court appears to have focused more on the fact that 
Turkey was taking inadequate measures to distance itself from and 
to suppress the elements committing murders. This is most obvious 
in its explanation of the particular protective measures Turkey 
should have taken. Specifically, the Court emphasized that the crim-
inal law and law enforcement measures implemented were inade-
quate under the circumstances to prevent attacks by groups aligned 
with the government.166 The requirement that the government take 
preventative measures consisting of effective law and law enforce-
ment targets the source of risk to individuals’ lives—specifically, by 
deterring or detaining potential perpetrators—and not the particular 
risk itself. The Court’s insistence that Turkey adequately distance 
itself from those committing the violations is also clear in its repeat-
ed reference to the connection between the perpetrators and the 
state. For instance, it repeatedly mentions the strong implication 
that members of the security forces acquiesced or assisted in the vio-
lations of the right to life.167 
B.   Inter-American Court Jurisprudence on                                     
Paramilitaries in Colombia 
 The Inter-American Court has also applied the threshold re-
quirement for review with some flexibility—specifically when consid-
ering Colombian paramilitary groups—explicitly going beyond the 
text of the responsibility rule to find responsibility for inadequate 
protection despite the lack of a known risk to an individual or group 
of individuals. In its Pueblo Bello decision, the Court noted that  
it has not been proved that the State authorities had specific prior 
knowledge of the day and time of the attack on the population of 
 164. Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 149, ¶ 89. 
 165. Koku, App. No. 27305/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 131. 
 166. Mahmut Kaya, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 100, 115-16; cf. Akkoç, 2000-X Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶¶ 85-92; Kılıç, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 69-71, 75; Mahmut Kaya, 2000-III Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶¶ 91-99. 
 167. Akkoç, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 84; Kılıç, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 68; Mahmut 
Kaya, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 91. 
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Pueblo Bello and the way it would be carried out. For example, no ev-
idence has been provided to show that the inhabitants of this village 
had reported acts of intimidation or threats before this attack.168 
Despite the lack of state knowledge, the Court found Colombia re-
sponsible for failure to protect, thereby exceeding the strict require-
ments of the announced threshold requirement for review.169 
 The Inter-American Court implicitly relaxed the threshold re-
quirement that the state know of the specific risk against the back-
drop of several potentially relevant factors. First, there was a clear 
implication that the state could and “would direct its control and se-
curity operations against [the illegal paramilitary groups].”170 That is 
to say, the Court recognized that the state, under the circumstances, 
should target the source of the risk to human rights, even if it lacked 
knowledge of “real and imminent danger” to the rights of a particular 
individual or individuals. Second, it repeatedly referenced the fact 
that “by having encouraged the creation of these groups, the State 
objectively created a dangerous situation for its inhabitants” as well 
as that the state had been ineffective in “dismantling the paramili-
tary structures,” in part because of “connivance or collaboration with 
State agents.”171  
C.   Diagnosis of the Flexible Application of the                                  
Current Responsibility Rule 
 This jurisprudence of the regional human rights courts shows 
them struggling with how exactly to define the threshold require-
ment for reviewing inadequate state protection, given the fact that 
the courts probably cannot review and impose responsibility for every 
violation of the state obligation to protect. The courts have recognized 
that the fundamental state protection obligation is extremely broad. 
The European Court has recognized on multiple occasions that states 
have the broad duty “to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives 
of those within its jurisdiction.”172 The Inter-American Court has es-
tablished that the state has a duty to “ensure respect for—
guarantee—the norms of protection and also to ensure the effective-
ness of all the rights established in the Convention in all circum-
stances and with regard to all persons.”173 However, the courts have 
 168. Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 135 (Jan. 31, 2006). 
 169. Id. ¶ 140. 
 170. Id. ¶ 134. 
 171. Id. ¶¶ 126-27; see also Valle Jaramillo v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 192, ¶¶ 76, 80 (Nov. 27, 2008). 
 172. Kılıç, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 62; Osman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23452/94, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 15 (1998). 
 173. Pueblo Bello, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 111. 
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also recognized that they cannot provide for every violation of this 
broad obligation, leaving much of the compliance with the obligation 
to state discretion. 
 As a result, the state’s obligation to protect can be distinguished 
from the conditions in which the human rights courts will review 
compliance and potentially impose responsibility. The human rights 
courts need not, and have chosen not to, review every potential devia-
tion from the state’s broad duty to protect, in part because the inter-
ference of the courts in such a policy-heavy area raises substantial 
questions of their appropriate role with respect to states and how to 
best use limited court resources. The specific formal responsibility 
rule that the courts apply arose in response to particular circum-
stances—namely, a relatively unpredictable murder in England—but 
became fixed in international jurisprudence as the formal threshold 
requirement for determining when the courts may review state pro-
tection efforts. The cases discussed above suggest that the courts 
have implicitly recognized that some situations not fitting within the 
narrow bounds of the threshold requirement may and should none-
theless be adjudicated internationally. However, the courts have not 
yet announced any alternative threshold requirement for review that 
may be applicable in other circumstances. 
 In the following parts, I will identify and clarify two major princi-
ples that guide the courts in determining the scope of their review 
and that can guide the development of appropriate situation-specific 
responsibility rules. These principles counsel explicitly relaxing the 
threshold requirement for review for cases of inadequate protection 
against acts of MCO violence. On the one hand, the courts have re-
sponded to the state’s reluctance to protect with relaxed threshold 
requirements for review, as we have seen in this part’s discussion. 
Because the MCOs, despite constituting quasi-armed groups, do not 
primarily direct violence against the state and in fact often try to 
subvert it or its officials, the state often lacks strong incentives to 
respond strongly to the threat they present. On the other hand, the 
courts have been unmistakably concerned with avoiding review of 
protection efforts, and imposing responsibility when doing so would 
unreasonably interfere with state policy-making. However, any such 
interference is substantially reduced in the face of MCOs, since the 
state is not asked to protect against unpredictable risks but against a 
focused risk. For these reasons, expanded human rights court review 
of state compliance with the duty to protect is appropriate. 
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V.   RISK OF STATE FAILURE TO PROTECT AND                                            
REQUIREMENTS FOR REVIEW 
 In this part, I will argue that considerations applied by the human 
rights courts in the past to determine the scope of review for state 
failure to protect support an expanded responsibility rule in the face 
of MCO violence. First, I will argue that the courts have expressed 
through their jurisprudence a latent principle that the threshold re-
quirement for review should be adjusted to allow for review of protec-
tion efforts when there is a systemic risk that the state will inade-
quately protect against violence. This principle allows the courts to 
use their limited judicial competence efficiently to promote compli-
ance with the state human rights obligation to protect by focusing 
resources on those issues most in need of their intervention. Relaxing 
the threshold requirement allows courts to motivate states to fulfill 
the obligation to protect and will be particularly effective when the 
loosened review requirement is explicitly announced. Second, I will 
argue based on the example of neoparamilitaries in Colombia that a 
state may be particularly reluctant to protect against MCOs for a 
number of reasons. 
A.   Risk of State Failure to Protect as an Expansionary Principle 
 Regional human rights courts have regularly expanded state re-
sponsibility for failure to protect when structural conditions indicate 
a systemic risk that the state will inadequately protect the rights of 
individuals, reflecting a latent principle in the jurisprudence. Both 
the European Court and the Inter-American Court exceeded the nar-
row terms of the announced review requirement in cases where vio-
lent groups had the tacit support of some set of state officials. The 
European Court, in the cases addressing protection during the PKK 
conflict in Turkey, repeatedly noted that the murders at issue ap-
peared to have been committed by groups acting in Turkey’s interest 
and that some parts of the state security forces appeared to have 
acquiesced in the groups’ activities.174 Similarly, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights considered it relevant to state responsibility 
that Colombia had encouraged the formation of paramilitary groups 
and that parts of the security forces had connived or collaborated 
with the groups.175 In both Turkey and Colombia, the links between 
the state and the violent groups indicate that at least some elements 
of the state lacked motivation to vigorously protect against their at-
tacks. The courts found this fact relevant in generously construing 
the formal limits of the standard threshold requirement or in exceed-
 174. Akkoç v. Turkey, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 389, ¶ 83; Kılıç, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 
¶ 68; Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 149, ¶ 91. 
 175. Pueblo Bello, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶¶ 126-27. 
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ing them altogether. For these reasons, the principle according to 
which the courts should expand the scope of review in the face of risk 
of inadequate protection can be considered a sound way to make 
sense of the judgments in this area of jurisprudence. 
 Employing a principle according to which the courts vary the 
scope of review of state protection efforts in response to systemic 
risks makes sense given the structure of regional human rights court 
systems. The courts are a secondary mechanism for upholding      
human rights with limited institutional competence, practically if  
not legally. They are secondary mechanisms in the sense that the 
state is the primary agent responsible for upholding human rights, 
both by directly refraining from violating them and by ensuring that 
all state organs comply with human rights obligations.176 And as a 
secondary mechanism, the courts have limited institutional compe-
tence. This shortcoming results both from the limited capacity that 
the courts and their systems have to resolve contentious cases and 
from a need the courts have recognized to avoid interfering inappro-
priately with state policy-making. But, despite their limited institu-
tional competence, the courts are committed to upholding human 
rights in the states subject to their jurisdiction according to the 
courts’ own interpretations of the applicable human rights treaty 
standards. Harmonizing its broad institutional commitment to inter-
preting human rights standards and upholding human rights by ap-
plying limited institutional competence requires care in the deploy-
ment of available resources. 
 While the courts have established that states have a very broad 
obligation to protect,177 for reasons of institutional competence they 
must carefully allocate resources dedicated to overseeing and enforc-
ing the obligation. The courts can apply different sorts of resources to 
enforce the obligation, such as by hearing individual cases, providing 
provisional measures, or issuing advisory opinions. The goal of such 
deployment in the context of protection is to eliminate certain fail-
ures of state compliance resulting from a lack of interest in protect-
ing or a positive opposition to protecting, by creating new incentives 
for the state to protect. But because of limited institutional compe-
tence, the quantity of available resources is limited, making it impos-
sible to respond to every failure to protect with an individual conten-
 176. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 134, at art. 46 (requiring 
exhaustion of domestic remedies for recourse in the Inter-American system); European 
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 134, at art. 35 (requiring exhaustion of domestic 
remedies for recourse in the European system); see also American Convention on Human 
Rights, supra note 134, at art. 1 (establishing state obligations to both respect and ensure 
the fulfillment of rights); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 134, at art. 1 
(establishing state obligations to respect and to secure the fulfillment of rights). 
 177. Pueblo Bello, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 124 (citing Kılıç, 2000-III Eur. 
Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 62-63; Osman, App. No. 23452/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 115-16). 
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tious case or provisional measures decision. Instead, the courts must 
ration these resources. Court resources get allocated in different 
ways, in part by the choices of advocates and lawyers who decide 
which cases get brought. But the courts also shape the distribution of 
judicial resources by imposing requirements that exclude certain 
failure to protect cases from court review, despite the fact that the 
courts have acknowledged a broad obligation to protect. 
 Both the European Court and the Inter-American Court have sub-
stantial capacity limitations—even if these take different forms in 
each—that limit the resources they can deploy to motivate state 
compliance. The Inter-American Court in 2012 issued only nineteen 
merits decisions in contentious cases. While the European Court in 
2011 issued 1157 judgments in contentious cases, resolving 1511 ap-
plications, these numbers substantially decreased from the prior 
year, leaving 151,600 applications pending in the system.178 Laurence 
Helfer described similar statistics in a prior year as constituting a 
docket crisis.179 In such conditions, it may be best for the courts to 
leave cases to other protective mechanisms, unless human rights 
court review will be particularly useful in ensuring the fulfillment of 
human rights. But by expanding review in response to systemic risk 
of inadequate state protection, the courts are able to limit their case-
load except when the court is most likely to be useful in promoting 
state compliance with its obligations. 
 At the same time, a principle according to which the courts should 
vary the scope of review of state protection efforts based on systemic 
risk makes sense given the general concern that the courts will leave 
insufficient policy discretion to states.180 Although there is less risk of 
inappropriate interference when state officials knew or should have 
known of a particular human rights risk, much review of state pro-
tection efforts will put the courts in the position of second-guessing 
state policy. Against such a background concern, it makes sense for 
the courts not to involve themselves in the review of state protection 
efforts except when doing so is particularly important from a human 
rights perspective. Avoiding review except when important helps 
circumvent any unnecessary direct interference with state policy-
making in the area of protection, leaving more discretion to the 
states. However, it remains important for the courts to review protec-
tion efforts when these are likely to be inadequate—violating state 
 178. EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2011 4-5 (2012), available 
at http://echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2011_ENG.pdf. 
 179. Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embed-
dedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 125, 126 (2008). 
 180. See infra Part VI. 
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human rights obligations—as ensuring the fulfillment of human 
rights is a primary purpose of regional human rights courts. 
 In this context, it makes sense for the courts generally to limit the 
obligation to protect cases they are willing to hear by imposing strict 
threshold requirements, but to loosen those requirements when they 
would exclude cases where there is a systemic risk of state failure to 
protect. Such a principle allows the court to respect its limited insti-
tutional competence while also fulfilling its primary purpose of en-
suring human rights, and specifically the right to state protection. It 
respects limited institutional competence by minimizing both the 
overall quantity of judicial resources devoted to protection cases and 
intrusions into state policy-making. But it simultaneously fulfills the 
purpose of ensuring human rights because the courts devote addi-
tional institutional capacity to issues of state protection when it is 
most needed. Given a systemic risk that the state will fail to protect, 
the use of court resources can provide new incentives for state com-
pliance with the obligation to protect.  
B.   The Need for an Explicit, Broadened Responsibility Rule 
 These same reasons that support adjusting the scope of review of 
protection efforts in response to particular risks indicate that it is 
best to do so via an explicitly relaxed threshold requirement. In order 
to effectively allocate judicial resources to promote state compliance 
with protection obligations in light of a systemic risk of inadequate 
protection, the courts must be attentive to the various ways in which 
they can promote compliance. In light of some important methods of 
promoting compliance, a clear expression of a changed threshold re-
quirement will be more effective in providing the desired motivation 
to states than a flexible, case-by-case application of a misleadingly 
limited requirement: many methods through which compliance is 
promoted depend on communicating court standards to third parties. 
Thus, even though the courts have sometimes applied the threshold 
requirement with flexibility, it is important that they formally and 
explicitly adjust it. 
 Regional human rights courts can promote state compliance with 
regional human rights obligations both directly and indirectly.181 The 
courts directly promote state compliance by providing oversight and 
accountability, in that they directly review state actions or omissions 
 181. Helfer, in fact, distinguishes four different international tribunal functions, two of 
which roughly correspond to the modes of promoting compliance discussed here. Laurence 
R. Helfer, The Effectiveness of International Adjudicators, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF IN-
TERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 464 (Karen J. Alter et al. eds., 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2194189. 
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for compliance with the relevant human rights standards. 182  This 
method of promoting compliance is perhaps the most readily appar-
ent to the casual observer, as it is a direct result of resolving conten-
tious cases brought against states. But the courts also indirectly 
promote state compliance by providing a focal point or reframing an 
issue for further action by third parties, such as the international 
community of states, advocacy networks, domestic courts, or the pub-
lic at large.183 These third parties then act in a variety of ways to 
pressure the state to comply with the human rights standards as the 
human rights courts interpret them.184 For example, domestic courts 
may apply those standards directly in domestic cases, advocacy   
networks may organize around the announced norm interpretation, 
and the public may reconceive of an issue through the lens of the 
interpreted norms. 
 Establishing a clear rule regarding the appropriate circumstances 
for review of state protection efforts against MCOs is important from 
the perspective of providing direct compliance through oversight and 
accountability. A clear rule promotes consistency across judgments 
and within judgments, assuring that the rule as announced and the 
rule as applied are one and the same.185 Both are highly desirable 
characteristics to maintain the internal integrity of a human rights 
court’s functioning and to avoid accusations of bias or unfairness 
from litigants. At the same time, a clear rule can invite appropriate 
lawsuits to be brought, by making it clear that the facts of a particu-
lar case meet the requirements for review according to regional hu-
man rights standards. For this reason, clearer threshold require-
ments would facilitate states being held accountable for failures to 
protect against MCOs adequately, thereby providing a source of mo-
tivation for such protection. 
 182. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 134, at art. 62(3); European 
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 134, at art. 32; Helfer, supra note 181, at 464-66. 
 183. See Rodríguez-Garavito, supra note 17, at 1676 (“I posit that the potential range of 
relevant effects includes—in addition to governmental action specifically mandated by the 
court—the reframing of socioeconomic issues as human rights problems, the strengthening 
of state institutional capacities to deal with such problems, the forming of advocacy coali-
tions to participate in the implementation process, and the promoting of public deliberation 
and a collective search for solutions on the complex distributional issues underlying struc-
tural cases on SERs.”). 
 184. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 134, at art. 62; European 
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 134, at art. 32; Helfer, supra note 181, at 464-66. 
Third parties commonly interpret the meaning of standards through decisions rendered in 
contentious cases and, on occasion, via advisory opinions. American Convention on Human 
Rights, supra note 134, at arts. 62, 64; European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 
134, at arts. 32, 47. 
 185. For example, the Pueblo Bello decision arguably suffers from a grave defect in this 
regard. As previously argued, it announces a responsibility rule and threshold requirement 
for review that it then ignores in order to review state protection efforts. 
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 Although motivating compliance via oversight and accountability 
is an important function of human rights courts, indirectly promoting 
compliance by catalyzing third-party action through standard setting 
and interpretation is probably more important, given the limited in-
stitutional competence of the courts. For example, the limited num-
ber of cases that the courts can resolve substantially reduces the ef-
fect courts have on state human rights compliance via resolution of 
individual contentious cases. But standard setting and interpretation 
can have an effect that extends far beyond individual contentious 
cases. First, such standards may constitute rallying points for social 
movements, NGOs, and other actors at the national and internation-
al levels dedicated to affecting state human rights compliance.186 Sec-
ond, a clear court standard relevant to a social problem may affect 
the way policy makers and the public view it, causing them to recon-
ceive the problem as a rights violation and change their views about 
its seriousness.187 This effect is of particular importance when the 
state has actively rejected the human rights significance of MCO 
activity, such as when the Colombian government has dismissed  
neoparamilitaries as mere Bacrim or “criminal bands.” 188 Third, a 
clear standard provides an effective guide for domestic courts to ap-
ply the regional human rights instruments in domestic proceedings. 
This practice is particularly common in Latin American constitution-
al law due to the frequent incorporation of human rights instruments 
into constitutions.189  
 In contrast to the substantial effects an explicitly modified review 
requirement can have, a non-explicit and contextually applied review 
standard for state protection efforts is less likely to serve these pur-
poses. Such a standard fails to provide clear guidance or a clear in-
terpretation of the human rights instruments for social movements, 
policy makers, national courts, and others. The courts may impose 
threshold requirements largely because of institutional competence 
issues—limited capacity and avoiding interference with state policy-
making—so the requirements may not reflect fundamental human 
rights standards. But even if the threshold requirements are primari-
ly created for the courts to manage institutional competence, actors 
 186. See, e.g., James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional 
Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American 
Court, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 768, 770 (2008). 
 187. See Rodríguez-Garavito, supra note 17, at 1679. 
 188. See, e.g., Presidente Santos puso en marcha el Consejo Nacional de Seguridad, 
PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA (Feb. 7, 2011), http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/ 
Prensa/2011/Febrero/Paginas/ 20110207_05.aspx. 
 189. See generally MANUEL EDUARDO GÓNGORA MERA, INTER-AMERICAN JUDICIAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2011) (systematically analyzing the status of human rights treaties 
in the Latin American legal system and concluding that there is an emerging consensus 
that they have either supra-legal or constitutional rank). 
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external to the courts are likely to receive the threshold requirements 
as substantive descriptions of the state obligation to protect.190 For 
this reason, a court that is concerned about maximizing its effect on 
human rights compliance in light of limited judicial capacity and 
avoiding interference with state policy-making should use that capac-
ity to explicitly announce its review requirements. 
C.   Risk of State Failure to Protect and Protection against MCOs 
 As previously argued, the main reason to relax the threshold re-
quirement for review of state protection measures against MCOs is 
the systemic risk for inadequate state protection in these circum-
stances. This subpart will discuss, using Colombian neoparamilitar-
ies as an example, several reasons why this systemic risk exists: 
MCOs do not directly confront central state authority, they common-
ly corrupt state officials, and they most severely affect disfavored 
segments of the population that are of less interest to the state. 
1.   Limited Confrontation with the State 
 A systemic risk that the state will inadequately protect against 
MCOs arises from the fact that they are quite different in character 
from other sorts of violent groups that might operate within a state’s 
territory. Insurgent groups seek to contest directly a state’s control of 
its territory, either in whole or in part, generally in hopes of replac-
ing the state or seceding from it.191 By directly contesting state con-
trol, such groups automatically provoke the state to respond to the 
group, generally with force, in an effort to maintain its territorial 
control. Of course, the response may not be concerned with citizen 
security and protection of individuals from violence, and may in fact 
lead to widespread violations of human rights. Colombia’s decades-
long armed conflict with the FARC-EP provides a clear example of 
the phenomenon. Particularly since the election of ex-President 
Uribe, the Colombian state aggressively fought against the FARC in 
 190. Although the courts have announced that the state obligation to protect is broad, 
this description is likely to be understood as aspirational, with the actual legal standard 
understood to be that which the courts themselves apply, including the threshold require-
ment. Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 124 (Jan. 31, 2006) (citing Kılıç v. Turkey, 2000-III Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 75, ¶¶ 62-63; Osman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23452/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 
¶¶ 115-16 (1998)). 
 191. For example, in Colombia, the FARC-EP and the ELN are two revolutionary 
armed groups that seek to replace the state and that have incited a strong state response. 
See, e.g., Int’l Crisis Grp., Colombia: Peace at Last?, LATIN AM. REP. NO. 45, Sept. 2012,      
at 2-9, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/045-
colombia-peace-at-last.pdf.  
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order to re-establish territorial control, albeit while committing seri-
ous human rights violations.192  
 Unlike the FARC, neoparamilitaries in Colombia have a complex 
relationship to the Colombian state, despite probably constituting 
parties to the internal armed conflict.193 Although the neoparamili-
taries occasionally engage in hostilities with state armed forces, they 
do not have the overthrow of the Colombian state as a primary 
goal. 194  Instead, their goals are primarily to reshape local social 
structures in order to maintain and expand their illegal businesses, 
in part through expanding territorial presence.195 While these goals of 
the neoparamilitaries may bring them into conflict with the state for 
some purposes—since they are engaged in illegal activities that the 
state may attempt to stop through law enforcement—the groups have 
no need to contest state authority for most purposes. So long as the 
state does not try to stop their illegal businesses, there is no intrinsic 
conflict with state presence—such as if the state enforces laws 
against unaffiliated criminals or maintains public infrastructure—in 
the areas that the neoparamilitaries control.196 Because of the limited 
challenge to state authority, state officials, particularly at the local 
level, may have less motivation to respond to these groups effectively 
than they have for a guerrilla group like the FARC that seeks to 
overthrow the state completely. A potential modus vivendi exists 
between the Colombian state and the neoparamilitaries that simply 
does not exist between the Colombian state and the FARC.197  
 The facts clearly reflect the potential of neoparamilitaries to de-
velop something of a modus vivendi with parts of the state appa-
ratus. Nuevo Arco Iris reports that between 2006 and 2008, 55 per-
cent of reported neoparamilitary group actions involved offensive 
actions and only 12 percent of reported actions involved combat with 
 192. Although the FARC continues to provoke a strong state response, it is important 
to note that the effort against the FARC has been framed primarily as a matter of national 
security and has resulted in massive human rights violations. See id.  
 193. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 6, at 3 (determining that both the 
Rastrojos and the Urabeños are parties to the Colombian internal armed conflict); Inter-
view with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, supra note 27 (reporting that the Colombian gov-
ernment has determined that the organizations are legally not parties under IHL, but 
conceding that the determination is arguable). 
 194. Oñate, supra note 36, at 10. 
 195. See supra Part II. 
 196. See Ortiz, supra note 50, at 17 (noting that the neoparamilitaries engage in very 
few attacks against state forces because they lack a counter-state purpose). 
 197. The differing potential for a modus vivendi between armed groups without a 
counter-state purpose and one with such a purpose is reflected in the relative rates of 
corruption of elected officials during the era of the AUC. See, e.g., Claudia López Hernán-
dez, “La Refundación de la Patria”, de la teoría a la evidencia, in Y REFUNDARON LA PA-
TRIA . . . : DE CÓMO MAFIOSOS Y POLÍTICOS RECONFIGURARON EL ESTADO COLOMBIANO 29, 51 
(Claudia López Hernández ed., 2010). 
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state forces.198 These numbers suggest that neoparamilitary groups 
have typically avoided targeting state forces despite engaging in a 
large number of violent actions, thereby not providing state forces 
any immediate reason to repress them. Other reports indicate that 
some segments of the state security forces have not aggressively ini-
tiated actions against the neoparamilitaries. For example, local police 
in one city in Meta failed to take action against ERPAC activity in 
surrounding areas because their responsibility was technically lim-
ited to the city. 199  Additionally, many military commanders have 
voiced reluctance to act against the neoparamilitaries, viewing the 
problem as principally one for the police, even though the military 
was formally assigned joint responsibility for the problem.200 
2.   Corruption of State Officials 
 A second source of risk that a state will be inadequately motivated 
to act against MCOs arises from the potential corruption of the state 
apparatus at a variety of levels. In Colombia in particular, there is 
substantial evidence that neoparamilitaries have co-opted local police 
and military officials through extensive payments. Beyond directly 
 198. Romero & Arias, supra note 37, at 38. 
 199. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 95. 
 200. OFICINA DEL ALTO ASESOR PARA LA SEGURIDAD NACIONAL, supra note 25, at 3; 
Interview with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, supra note 27. Responsibility for addressing 
the problem of neoparamilitaries was previously assigned to the National Police, with the 
armed forces having only secondary responsibility. The police were able to request military 
assistance if necessary, which was granted at the discretion of the military. In the absence 
of such a request, divisions of the military were permitted, but not required, to respond to 
neoparamilitary groups operating in their area. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Directiva 
Permanente No. 208, §§ 3(b)(1)(b), 3(b)(6)(f) (2008). Within the police, the Division of 
Caribineers and Rural Security had primary authority for combating the MCOs. 
  Dividing responsibility for a public security problem between the military and the 
police may make sense under some conditions, but not under those that exist currently in 
Colombia. A division of authority may make sense in order to keep the military from being 
involved in a law enforcement matter and the concomitant increased risk of serious human 
rights violations that accompany that role. However, such a division does not make sense 
in Colombia at present. The national police do not have a regular presence in many areas 
where the MCOs are active, while the military may have a substantial presence. See HU-
MAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 95; Int’l Crisis Grp., supra note 47, at ii. As a result, 
the military is often best positioned to take action to suppress MCO activity in many re-
gions of the country. As the only security force presence, the failure of a military response 
allows the organizations to act with impunity. 
  The division of authority within the police itself was similarly problematic under 
the circumstances in Colombia. By assigning exclusive responsibility to a single Division of 
the National Police, it absolved other active police forces of the responsibility of confronting 
MCOs. Through the division of authority within the police, responsibility for addressing 
the problem of neoparamilitaries was effectively eliminated. Police areas of responsibility 
should be modified to reflect the reality that the police have limited resources that do not 
always cover an area where MCOs are active. Such a change of responsibility should be 
coupled with a standing order to confront the MCOs whenever they are encountered or 
their presence in an area is known. 
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interfering with the use of these elements of the public security forces 
to confront the neoparamilitaries when appropriate, such corruption 
can undermine suppressive actions taken by the other elements of 
the security forces as well as provide unique support for their illicit 
activities. Corrupt officials undermine suppressive actions of other 
state actors by providing both official cover for illegal activities and 
intelligence on likely law enforcement activities. For example, such 
aid allowed one neoparamilitary group leader to escape capture re-
peatedly by other elements of the public security forces.201 They also 
provide unique support in the form of official cover and access to 
state resources, such as firearms and documents. 
 Moreover, the neoparamilitaries appear to have begun infiltrating 
local government bodies, via manipulation of local elections, in a rep-
etition of the political control that the paramilitary groups estab-
lished. In one particularly egregious example, a neoparamilitary 
group managed to secure the election of a local personería, the local 
official in charge of receiving complaints of human rights viola-
tions.202 Additionally, in October 2011, during the run-up to the last 
local elections, a number of different observers warned of the poten-
tial for illegal interference, as indicated by substantial violence sur-
rounding electioneering. 203  The Misión de Observación Electoral 
found that out of 147 municipalities where there was violence against 
candidates, neoparamilitaries were present in 20, while out of the 87 
municipalities with violence against election officials, neoparamili-
taries were present in 14.204 Moreover, Nuevo Arco Iris analyzed the 
backgrounds and connections of a number of candidates and identi-
fied a substantial number with potential links to illegal actors, in-
cluding neoparamilitaries.205 Following the election, Nuevo Arco Iris 
 201. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 98; see also Conflict Dynamics and Peace 
Negotiations Area, supra note 19, at 4 (reporting that alias Cuchillo escaped capture 
through official complicity). 
 202. Interview with Camilo Sanchez, Investigator, DeJuSticia, in Bogotá, Colom. (Jan. 
12, 2012). 
 203. Int’l Crisis Grp., Cutting the Links Between Crime and Local Politics: Colombia’s 
2011 Elections, LATIN AM. REP. NO. 37, July 2011, at 15-16; Elizabeth Dickenson, How 
Colombia’s Criminals are Bullying and Buying Their Way into Office, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
(Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/133716. 
 204. MISIÓN DE OBSERVACIÓN ELECTORAL, VIOLENCIA POLÍTICA 7, 12 (2011) (electoral 
violence in the period from Feb. 2, 2011 to Oct. 20, 2011). The organization confirmed the 
reports of violence following the elections. See Alejandra Barrios Cabrera, Asonadas y 
disturbios postelectorales: entre la indignación ciudadana y el fraude electoral, CIEN DIAS, 
Dec. 2011–Mar. 2012, at 41, 41-42. 
 205. NUEVO ARCO IRIS & OBSERVATORIO DEL CONFLICTO ARMADO, MAFIAS Y AGENTES 
ILEGALES BUSCAN RENTAS Y EL PODER LOCAL (2011) (Colom.), available at 
http://www.arcoiris.com.co/2011/11/mafias-y-agentes-ilegales-buscan-rentas-y-el-poder-local. 
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managed to identify eight specific examples of candidates who were 
probably elected with the support of neoparamilitaries.206 
 While the corruption of local state officials is troubling enough 
from the perspective of assuring an effective state response, there is 
also some potential that national officials will also be corrupted, as 
happened during the era of the AUC paramilitaries.207 In 2013, the 
Colombian Supreme Court expanded its investigation of politicians 
backed by paramilitaries to politicians backed by neoparamilitaries, 
in response to evidence that neoparamilitaries are seeking political 
power in this way.208 Indirectly, the groups may form beneficial alli-
ances with the local elite, who can use their political influence to af-
fect national policy regarding the organizations and the implementa-
tion thereof.209 More directly, the organizations may place their sup-
porters in national offices, such as the national legislature, through a 
variety of means, including funding and intimidation.210   
3.   Preferential Protection for Certain Groups 
 Finally, there is a serious risk that any state protection against 
MCOs will protect some places and people while failing to protect 
others–in particular, marginalized and vulnerable segments of the 
population. In Colombia, the neoparamilitaries operate across the 
country but have a heavy presence in rural areas or regions of the 
country considered to be of less significance from the perspective of 
national policy makers. For example, the Rastrojos have a stronghold 
in the southwestern department of Nariño, while the ERPAC focuses 
its activity in the Meta department.211 During 2011, the Urabeños 
and Rastrojos fought for control of the largely rural Cordobá depart-
ment.212 Additionally, neoparamilitary activity in cities tends to occur 
primarily in lower class neighborhoods that provoke less concern 
among state officials.213 The fact that neoparamilitary activity tends 
to emphasize regions and persons unlikely to be a priority for state 
 206. Ariel Fernando Ávila & Juan David Velasco, Triunfos y derrotas de las mafias en 
las locales, 17 ARCANOS 76, 87, 89-90 (2012) (Colom). 
 207. See generally NUEVO ARCO IRIS, PARAPOLÍTICA: LA RUTA DE LA EXPANSIÓN PARA-
MILITAR Y LOS ACUERDOS POLÍTICOS (Mauricio Romero ed., 2007) (Colom.). 
 208. Arrázola, supra note 112. 
 209. See generally NUEVO ARCO IRIS, supra note 207. 
 210. See generally id. 
 211. See INDEPAZ, VII INFORME, supra note 36, at 11, 18. 
 212. Ortiz, supra note 50, at 31-35. 
 213. See, e.g., Elyssa Pachico, Urban Battle in Medellin as Outsider Drug Cartel Moves 
in, INSIGHT CRIME (June 28, 2012) (Colom.), http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/ 
urban-battle-in-medellin-as-outsider-drug-cartel-moves-in. 
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officials creates a substantial risk that protection against the neo-
paramilitaries will be based on the needs of the elite.214  
 The events surrounding the murder of two Universidad de los 
Andes students in Córdoba in January 2011 provide a clear, if coun-
terintuitive, illustration of this risk. According to the Fundación Ide-
as para la Paz, this event increased the attention that elite policy 
makers gave to the problem of neoparamilitaries. For example, the 
Ministry of Defense and the National Security Council discussed the 
topic of the neoparamilitaries for the first time following these mur-
ders215 and decided to implement the first Operation Troya to reduce 
neoparamilitary activity in Córdoba.216 While the groups had previ-
ously been active in the region, it took an attack on students of an 
elite university to focus the attention of the national government. 
D.   Conclusion 
 Regional human rights courts view the state as having a broad 
obligation to protect individuals under its jurisdiction from violations 
of their human rights, including the right to life. For a variety of rea-
sons connected to institutional competence, they decline to review 
judicially the full scope of this obligation and normally limit review of 
state protection efforts to situations in which state officials knew or 
should have known of a real and immediate risk. However, the courts 
have been willing to review state protection actions beyond the nar-
row confines of the official threshold requirement when there was a 
systemic risk that the state would fail to fulfill its broad protection 
obligation. The circumstances that MCOs—such as the neoparamili-
taries in Colombia—present is precisely one that establishes such a 
risk. Because the neoparamilitaries do not intrinsically oppose the 
state, but systematically corrupt state officials and primarily affect 
disfavored social groups, there is a significant risk that the Colombi-
an state will not fulfill its basic obligation to protect individuals with-
in its jurisdiction from neoparamilitary violence. By lowering the 
threshold requirement from state officials’ knowledge of a real and 
immediate risk to mere knowledge of the threat posed by an MCO, 
the courts would effectively require the state to take many of the 
most important protective actions.  
 214. For example, Indepaz reports that government attention to the issue of neopara-
militaries waxed and waned depending on whether particularly salient events recently 
occurred. Interview with Carlos Espitia & Juan Carlos Jiménez, Investigators, Indepaz, in 
Bogotá, Colom. (Jan. 12, 2012). 
 215. Interview with Carlos Andrés Prieto, supra note 33. 
 216. Ortiz, supra note 50, at 7, 10; Cuatro mil hombres ejecutan la ‘Operación Troya,’ 
supra note 92; En 90 días, Policía pretende asfixiar finanzas de bandas criminales, EL 
TIEMPO (Feb. 6, 2011) (Colom.), http://m.eltiempo.com/justicia/as-ser-la-operacion-troya-
contra-las-bandas-criminales-en-crdoba/8831980. 
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VI.   INTRUSION ON STATE POLICY DISCRETION                                          
AND REQUIREMENTS FOR REVIEW 
 One important reason why the regional human rights courts may 
have limited institutional competence for reviewing state protection 
measures has to do with the need to avoid inappropriately intruding 
on state policy-making discretion. This factor has been important in 
leading the human rights courts to establish a strict threshold re-
quirement for reviewing state protection efforts. Regional human 
rights courts have acknowledged that the state should not be respon-
sible for just any human rights violation committed by a private indi-
vidual: “[I]ts obligations to adopt prevention and protection measures 
for individuals in their relationships with each other are conditioned 
by the awareness of a situation of real and imminent danger for a 
specific individual or group of individuals and to the reasonable pos-
sibilities of preventing or avoiding that danger.”217 They arrived at 
this limitation for court review of state protection efforts despite ac-
knowledging a broad state obligation to protect in order to avoid in-
appropriate interference with state policy-making.218 In the preceding 
part, I suggested that one reason to limit court review except in the 
face of systemic risks of inadequate state protection was to avoid in-
appropriate interference in policy-making, given the limited institu-
tional competence of the courts. In this part, I will directly argue that 
loosening threshold requirements for review of state protection efforts 
against MCOs would not give rise to such inappropriate interference.  
A.   Intrusion on State Policy Discretion as a Limiting Principle 
 A primary reason that the regional human rights courts limit 
their review of state protections efforts to situations in which public 
authorities knew about a risk of a particular violation and failed to 
act is to avoid inappropriate interference with the state. This preoc-
cupation is rooted in the particular jurisprudential history of the re-
sponsibility rule for inadequate state protection. In the cases in 
which the current threshold requirement for review developed, ab-
sent knowledge of a specific risk, it would have been inappropriate to 
review the protective actions that authorities had implemented and 
possibly to hold them responsible for inadequately protecting. Conse-
quently, the courts sharply limited the circumstances in which they 
would review inadequate protection, presumably to avoid improperly 
intruding on the legitimate sphere of state policy discretion. 
 217. Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 123 (Jan. 31, 2006). 
 218. Id. ¶ 124 (citing Kılıç v. Turkey, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 75, ¶¶ 62-63; Osman v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 23452/94, Eur. Ct. H.R., 1, ¶¶ 115-16 (1998)). 
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 The lead case for this proposition is the European Court of Human 
Rights’ decision in Osman, which concerned an obsessive teacher’s 
attack on a family, resulting in the death of the student’s father. In 
deciding the case, the Court recognized that a state could, on occa-
sion, be responsible for failure to protect a person against the viola-
tion of his or her rights by third parties. However, it limited the scope 
of the responsibility on the following pragmatic grounds: 
For the Court, and bearing in mind the difficulties involved in po-
licing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and 
the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities 
and resources, such an obligation must be interpreted in a way 
which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden 
on the authorities. Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can 
entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take opera-
tional measures to prevent that risk from materialising.219 
In effect, the Court identified three reasons for limiting the scope of 
responsibility so as to avoid imposing an inappropriate burden on 
state authorities. First, it acknowledged that it could be difficult to 
police modern societies. Second, it noted that human conduct is un-
predictable. Third, it agreed that the state must be given some scope 
to allocate resources and set priorities.   
 The last of these considerations—that the state should be given 
scope to set priorities and allocate resources—is analytically unhelp-
ful because the consideration is supposed to help determine exactly 
that: the appropriate scope of state independence from human rights 
court review. The Court advances this consideration when deciding 
how far court review of state protection efforts should extend. But the 
extent of such review is exactly a question of the extent to which the 
state should be deprived of the ability to determine resource alloca-
tion and to set priorities, with the consequence of potential interna-
tional responsibility for failure to comply. In this context, it makes no 
sense to refer to the state the scope of setting priorities and allocating 
resources, because that scope is exactly what the Court is attempting 
to determine. Instead, the appropriate scope of state discretion must 
depend on the other considerations that the Court advances. 
 The first two considerations in turn seem to be of one piece: the 
reason it is difficult to police modern societies is because human con-
duct is unpredictable. In a society like England, where there is a gen-
eral background of law compliance, if human conduct, and, in partic-
ular, criminal conduct, were predictable, it would be easy to police 
the society. A society with limited and predictable criminal acts could 
be controlled with a minimum of resource expenditures. However, 
human criminal conduct is unpredictable, as the facts of Osman itself 
 219. Osman, App. No. 23452/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 116. 
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attest: while it is imaginable that an obsessive teacher might attack 
the family of a student, it is far from expected. Because the conduct is 
unexpected, it is very difficult to control. Absent intrusive surveil-
lance or omnipresence of police or other state security agents, it 
would be almost impossible to eliminate attacks of this sort complete-
ly. Instead, a society must implement general systems of law en-
forcement and criminal justice to decrease the overall levels of such 
crime. But the exact degree to which a state attempts to reduce such 
violence depends on a complex set of competing considerations, in-
cluding the costs of prevention, alternative uses of those resources, 
the possibilities for effectively reducing such instances of violence, 
intrusion on privacy resulting from increased enforcement, the desir-
able degree of due process protection, and the acceptability of harsh 
punitive measures. Under these conditions, applying an open-ended 
review of state protection measures for their reasonableness would 
require a regional human rights court to review the general balance 
of priorities that a particular state has chosen to adopt. Except in the 
most egregious cases, such as, for example, failing to implement any 
law enforcement and criminal justice mechanisms, such unrestrained 
and unlimited reconsideration of these priorities issues may be best 
avoided by regional human rights courts. 
 Even in a society that has a widespread problem of murder, it may 
not be possible to avoid a general balancing of competing policy con-
cerns when adjudicating inadequate protection. The Inter-American 
Court in González v. Mexico considered the kidnapping, rape, torture, 
and murder of three young women in Ciudad Juárez that took place 
amidst a wave of similar violence directed at women.220 While the 
Court ultimately found Mexico responsible for failure to take preven-
tative measures, it did so not on the basis of failure to take adequate 
measures prior to their abductions but for failure to respond appro-
priately to their disappearances.221 The Court rejected holding Mexico 
responsible for failure to take measures to protect women in Ciudad 
Juárez because the state did not know “of a real and imminent dan-
ger for the victims in this case” even though it knew that women in 
the city were generally at risk.222 Although state officials knew there 
was a wave of violence against a vulnerable subset of the population, 
evaluating whether the protective measures it took were reasonable 
in such circumstances would have required balancing a wide range of 
considerations relevant to criminal justice and law enforcement poli-
cy. Given the widespread and unpredictable violence, there were no 
 220. See González v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶¶ 277-78 (Nov. 16, 2009). 
 221. Id. ¶¶ 280-84. 
 222. Id. ¶ 282. 
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more specific protective measures that could be evaluated. In this 
sense, the Court rejected the possibility that women in Ciudad Juá-
rez might constitute a group of individuals at imminent risk,223 pre-
sumably because the risk to any particular individual in the group 
was so low and the at-risk group included a substantial portion of   
the population. 
 However, by limiting review of inadequate protection to those in-
stances where state officials knew of a focused risk, the courts would 
not have to consider the appropriate balance of competing policy con-
siderations. A focused risk is one that allows the state to take specific 
protective measures to stop the risk from materializing in injury and 
could include risks from a particular source or to a particular target. 
Such risks reduce the need for courts to balance competing policy 
considerations when determining if the state took adequate protec-
tive measures. First, the mere existence of a focused risk potentially 
reduces the number of actions that might be reasonably taken to pro-
tect a person. For example, if state officials know that a violent group 
will attempt to assassinate a particular journalist, reasonable protec-
tive measures might include having the police provide protection or 
investigating the source of the threat. They will not require rethink-
ing whether the entire law enforcement apparatus has sufficient po-
lice officers or whether the criminal justice system has sufficient 
judges and prosecutors.  
 Second, the fact that the state must know of the focused risk fur-
ther reduces the extent to which the inquiry will extend into the bal-
ance of priorities. A court’s inquiry need not focus on what a state 
that knew nothing of the risk could have done to prevent the particu-
lar violation, which would normally consist in strengthening the gen-
eral preventative capacity of law enforcement or the deterrent capac-
ity of the criminal justice system. Instead, the inquiry would focus on 
what a state with knowledge of the risk could do, which would gener-
ally consist of specific actions, circumventing the need for a broad 
balancing of policy priorities.   
 Third, even if a court will inevitably have to balance various policy 
considerations and prioritize some interests, the difficulty and con-
troversy of this determination is further reduced by the fact that    
the state knew of a serious risk. When the state knows of a focused 
risk and it is severe, responding effectively to that risk will almost 
always outweigh other policy priorities, in part because addressing   
a particular risk generally will not have a significant effect on     
competing priorities. 
 However, neither these considerations nor the jurisprudence sup-
port restricting review of protection measures to only those cases 
 223. Id. 
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where there was a known or knowable threat to a particular individ-
ual or small group of individuals. There are other focused risks that 
allow for court inquiries that can avoid balancing policy priorities. 
For example, knowledge of a significant source of risk to individuals, 
even if the individuals at risk are unknown, substantially limits the 
field of reasonable actions, allowing for a court inquiry that does not 
overly intrude in delicate policy balances. The court need not evalu-
ate whether the overall resources devoted to criminal justice and law 
enforcement systems were adequate. Instead, it need only evaluate 
whether the protective measures were adequate in response to a giv-
en threat, a determination that would have an effect on resource allo-
cation but that does not require a potentially broad inquiry into re-
source allocation. And, in fact, in many situations the court may only 
determine whether the resources made available were reasonably 
deployed to stop a source of risk.   
 Understanding the underlying limitation in terms of focused risks 
explains the result in González, in which the court would have had to 
determine whether overall resources dedicated to law enforcement 
were adequate. According to the facts of the case, state officials knew 
of a disproportionate risk to young, impoverished women of being 
kidnapped, raped and murdered, 224 but the risk was statistical in 
nature. An effective response to such a risk would not have involved 
merely protecting a particular person or persons, as the group of in-
dividuals at risk constituted a substantial subset of the population at 
large. Nor would it have involved taking targeted and focused 
measures to eliminate a particular source of risk, such as detaining 
the members of a particular organization devoted to committing  
such crimes. Instead, an effective response would have required   
controlling an entire society via a new general law enforcement poli-
cy.225 There was no focused risk that would have allowed for particu-
lar state protective measures, such as providing the victims with 
police protection.226 
 This interpretation of the knowledge of risk requirement—where 
it restricts review only if there was no focused risk allowing for spe-
cific protective measures short of a new general criminal justice or 
law enforcement policy—makes particular sense: it is not much more 
intrusive for the courts to review protection against a risk from a 
particular source than to review protection against a risk to a partic-
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. (suggesting that the lack of a general policy, without more, is not sufficient for 
state responsibility). 
 226. It is worth noting that González appears to reject subjecting state policy to search-
ing review only when determining state responsibility. In the reparations section, the 
Inter-American Court sets out extensive and resource intensive orders for changing the law 
enforcement structures that respond to reports of disappearances. Id. ¶¶ 474-508. 
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ular individual or individuals. For example, the European Court case 
of Kılıç v. Turkey found that the known risk was sufficient for state 
responsibility simply because the victim was a journalist for a news-
paper that had suffered a series of attacks against its journalists, 
producers, and distributors.227 That is, the individual was a member 
of a group at particular risk of suffering rights violations. However, 
the implied source of the risk was contra-guerrilla or terrorist groups 
possibly allied with state forces in their conflict with the PKK.228 The 
Court effectively recognized that the primary state failure was that it 
did not attempt to dismantle or at least neutralize the danger from 
these groups.229 Given that the required state actions principally re-
quired taking effective measures against the contra-guerrilla groups, 
it is largely irrelevant that state officials knew of the risk to the par-
ticular members of the newspaper. Instead, the Court would have 
imposed no greater burden had it simply required the state to take 
identical measures in light of state knowledge of the danger posed by 
the contra-guerrilla groups. 
 All that said, even though the courts would not have to determine 
whether the overall balance of policy priorities is acceptable when 
there is a focused risk, their decisions would still have effects on 
permissible resource allocation. And, as Barbara Armacost has ar-
gued, courts are ill-positioned to make decisions that could have sub-
stantial effects on the permissible allocation of public resources, so 
they should avoid these areas of social policy-making.230   
 However, there are two important reasons that such a conclusion 
should not be used to interpret regional human rights court princi-
ples. First, the regional human rights courts have already effectively 
decided that they are competent to make decisions that affect re-
source allocation. They frequently consider inadequate protection 
cases, where their decision could have a substantial effect on the re-
quired distribution of public resources, and in fact may tacitly involve 
second-guessing those resource allocations.231 Second, the idea that 
the courts should never involve themselves in protection decisions 
with a substantial effect on resource allocation makes sense only if 
the resources dedicated to protection are considered a discretionary 
matter, and not a matter of rights. But the courts have quite clearly 
established that providing protection is a general state obligation and 
 227. Kılıç v. Turkey, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R., 75, ¶¶ 66-67; see also Akkoç v. Turkey, 
2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 389, ¶¶ 85-93; Koku v. Turkey, App. No. 27305/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 
¶¶ 137-41 (2005); Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 149, ¶¶ 99-116. 
 228. Kılıç, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 68.   
 229. See id. ¶¶ 68, 71-75. 
 230. See Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due Pro-
cess Clause, 94 MICH L. REV. 982, 1003-08 (1996). 
 231. See supra Part III. 
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that receiving protection is a matter of right. 232  In general, prior 
rights and obligations, such as the obligation to respect the right to 
life or freedom of expression, limit state policy-making discretion and 
are a matter of judicial competence even when a particular problem 
is highly complex and involves many competing considerations.233 
 The general conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that 
regional human rights courts have restricted themselves from re-
viewing state protective measures when the state merely had 
knowledge of a generalized risk to a population with no focal point for 
specific protective actions. They restrict themselves to avoid evaluat-
ing the state’s potentially delicate balance of policy priorities, at least 
when the state failure to protect is not egregious. However, so long as 
the state knew of a serious and focused risk that allows a specific 
state protective response, court review of the protective measures 
will not intrude into the sphere of policy discretion best left to the 
state. In such circumstances, the field of review is reduced from gen-
eral criminal justice and law enforcement policy to the specific use of 
those and other resources to deactivate the threat. 
B.   Intrusion on State Policy Discretion and Protection Against MCOs 
 From the perspective of these considerations, MCOs like the neo-
paramilitaries in Colombia present a problem quite distinct from that 
of unpredictable violence. Unlike isolated actions by non-distinctive 
individuals, neoparamilitary groups pose a focused risk that poten-
tially can be targeted to eliminate their capacity to cause harm. Con-
sidered as a national phenomenon, there are only a handful of groups 
in total, including the Rastrojos, the Urabeños, and ERPAC.234 In any 
one area, there are generally only a few active groups, and in many 
areas only one group, a phenomenon that results from the fact the 
groups attempt to control territory and exclude other groups from 
that which they control. Additionally, the groups are organized to 
some degree at the national level,235 and at the local level they have a 
substantial degree of internal organization, arguably sufficient in 
 232. See id.  
 233. Perhaps the complicated debates over freedom of speech provide a good example. 
They involve considerations—such as autonomy of the individual, the market of ideas, and 
the potential harms that might arise from speech—that must be balanced to arrive at 
specific rule. Yet it is widely accepted that the courts are competent to determine the cor-
rect balance, in part because freedom of speech is a matter of rights and obligations, not 
mere policy discretion. 
 234. CAMILO GONZÁLEZ POSSO, INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS PARA EL DESARROLLO Y LA PAZ 
(INDEPAZ), LOS GRUPOS NARCOPARAMILITARES AVANZAN 2 (2011) (Colom.), available at 
http://viva.org.co/cajavirtual/svc0278/pdfs/articulo632_278.pdf; Interview with Juanita 
Goebertus Estrada, supra note 36. 
 235. Interview with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, supra note 36; Interview with Ariel 
Fernando Ávila Martinez, supra note 29; Interview with Carlos Andrés Prieto, supra note 33. 
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some cases to render them parties to the internal armed conflict.236 
Given the small number of groups and their substantial organization, 
the groups themselves provide an easy focal point for efforts to pro-
tect the population from their violence. 
 Beyond the purely structural feature, the groups provide a viable 
focal point for protective efforts because they have predictable meth-
ods, practices, and goals. Their primary businesses are the drug 
trade and extortion, both of which require that they control the terri-
tories in which these businesses occur. Maintaining this territorial 
control involves violently excluding competing groups from the terri-
tory, corrupting or otherwise circumventing state repressive efforts, 
and maintaining social control over the local population through fear 
and violence. 237 For example, the neoparamilitaries have regularly 
employed murder and massacre as tools to consolidate territorial 
control and advance their illegal business goals.238 Once the groups 
have gained and consolidated control of particular areas, they main-
tain that control and are commonly present. The general pattern      
of activities of the groups provides an additional focal point for     
protective measures. 
 For example, the mere known presence of the group in an area can 
provide state officials with a sufficient focal point to take actions to 
protect the nearby population’s physical security, which it is entirely 
foreseeable that the neoparamilitary groups will violate. At a local 
level, public security forces can take actions to prevent the members 
of a neoparamilitary group from committing acts of violence against 
the local population by capturing them or otherwise denying them 
access to the area. In cases where the presence is less obvious, police 
investigators and prosecutors can effectively and proactively develop 
intelligence on who belongs to these groups, in an effort to ensure 
that there is no impunity and that members of the groups face jus-
tice. Finally, targeted anti-corruption efforts could deprive a group of 
the local support it requires in order to survive and flourish. All of 
these actions would contribute to depriving neoparamilitary groups 
of access to a particular area, thereby protecting the local population 
from acts of violence.  
 The state response to the neoparamilitaries in Colombia has 
shown that a state is capable of implementing many of these protec-
tive measures against MCOs. National prosecutors have investigated 
and brought charges against the neoparamilitaries with the goal of 
 236. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 6, at 3; Interview with Ariel Fernando 
Ávila Martinez, supra note 29. 
 237. See supra Part II. 
 238. See supra Part II. 
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dismantling their organizational structures.239 Although these efforts 
are not necessarily tied to protecting individuals in particular areas, 
they demonstrate that it would not be unreasonable to require tar-
geted prosecutions of MCO members as a measure to protect against 
their violence. If effectively adopted by local prosecutors, it could po-
tentially aid in excluding the groups from a particular area. Addi-
tionally, public security forces have undertaken targeted initiatives, 
such as the Troya operations, which included coordinated and non-
lethal joint military and police operations to weaken groups operat-
ing in and around areas of particularly elevated violence.240 These 
actions indicate that even the local military and police forces could 
identify the MCOs and their members, if they so choose, and in the 
process protect the local population from their violence. 
C.   Conclusion 
 This part has argued that a primary factor the human rights 
courts consider in limiting the review of state protection efforts—the 
burden it imposes on state policy-making authority—should not con-
strain review of inadequate protection against MCOs. The courts 
have rejected interfering with state policy-making when there is no 
specific target for protective measures, as is the case with much 
crime in a moderately law-abiding society. In contrast, the MCOs 
provide ample targets for state action, as they are limited in number, 
predictably violent, and have standard practices. As a result, the 
burden on the state should not limit the scope of state responsibility 
for failure to protect against MCOs.   
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 In this Article, I have argued that international courts should 
adopt a relaxed threshold requirement for reviewing state failure to 
protect against MCOs. Instead of a review requirement that state 
officials knew or should have known of a real and immediate risk to 
an individual or group of individuals, they should only require that 
the state officials knew or should have known about the threat to 
human rights posed by an MCO. As a result, the state should be held 
responsible for a violation of the right to life as a result of an MCO 
action when: (i) the acts result in the victim’s death, (ii) the authori-
ties knew or should have known that the MCO posed a general risk 
 239. See Interview with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, supra note 36; see also OFICINA 
DEL ALTO ASESOR PARA LA SEGURIDAD NACIONAL, supra note 25, at 9; OFICINA DEL ALTO 
ASESOR PARA LA SEGURIDAD NATIONAL, supra note 102. 
 240. Juan Carlos Jiménez, Detrás de las cifras oficiales, PUNTO DE ENCUENTRO, Mar. 
2012, at 49, 57; Ortiz, supra note 50, at 7, 10; Cuatro mil hombres ejecutan la ‘Operación 
Troya,’ supra note 92; En 90 días, policía pretende asfixiar finanzas de bandas criminales, 
supra note 216. 
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to the lives of individuals, (iii) they failed to take reasonable 
measures to prevent the risk from materializing, and (iv) the omitted 
measures would have had a reasonable possibility of preventing the 
victim’s death.  
 The human rights courts have recognized a broad state obligation 
to protect, but they limit court review of state protection efforts by 
imposing a threshold requirement for review. This threshold re-
quirement arises from concerns about interfering with state policy-
making, the limited capacity of the courts, and their primary purpose 
of ensuring the fulfillment of human rights. A less restrictive thresh-
old requirement is appropriate in light of MCO violence because it 
would not unreasonably interfere with state policy-making and be-
cause there is a systemic risk that states will fail to protect adequate-
ly. For these reasons, the courts should recognize and apply the pro-
posed threshold requirement and related responsibility rule, which 
enforces a broader swath of a state’s fundamental obligation to pro-
tect in circumstances involving MCOs. The proposed changes would 
allow a state to be held responsible for failure to take proactive ac-
tion, at least at the local level, to eliminate the threat posed by MCOs 
and not just for the isolated circumstances in which officials knew or 
should have known of a particular act of violence that the MCOs 
were going to commit.   
 Even though the relaxed threshold requirement will put more 
pressure on states to protect adequately, it should not lead to sub-
stantial human rights violations by public security forces overzealous 
to protect. The state is and should be fully subject to the other hu-
man-rights-based restrictions on state conduct that apply inde-
pendently of the obligation to protect. That is, no reasonable protec-
tive measure required by the state obligation to protect would involve 
the violation of other rights of individuals. Consequently, state forces 
would gain nothing by fulfilling the duty to protect by committing 
independent rights violations, since these violations will equally sub-
ject the state to responsibility. In the end, the primary effect of the 
proposed expansion of court review would be to require local security 
forces already present in an area to take protective measures against 
MCOs they know or should know are active in the area, thereby in-
creasing security for individuals. 
 
